13.04.2022 • 9/2022
Economy in East Germany will not suffer more from the war in Ukraine than in Germany as a whole – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2022 and new data for the East German economy
The recovery of the East German economy, like that of Germany as a whole, will weaken considerably due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, the economic slump and recovery were not as pronounced as in West Germany. In 2021, East German output grew by 2.3%, less than in Germany as a whole (2.9%). According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), GDP growth in East Germany is also likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole in 2022 (2.1% in East Germany vs. 2.7% in Germany) and 2023 (2.5% vs. 3.1%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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Die Ost-West-Produktivitätslücke: Die Rolle von Produktspezialisierung, Produktpreisunterschieden und physischer Produktivität
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
Auch 30 Jahre nach der Deutschen Vereinigung erreicht die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft nur 82% der westdeutschen Arbeitsproduktivität. Dieser Unterschied in der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Arbeitsproduktivität steht in engem Zusammenhang mit vielen wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Problemen, denen Ostdeutschland heute gegenübersteht. Auf Basis differenzierter Daten zu den einzelnen Produkten, die Firmen im deutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbe herstellen, untersuchen wir in diesem Beitrag, wie sich ost- und westdeutsche Firmen bezüglich Produktspezialisierung, Produktpreisen und technischer Effizienz unterscheiden. Wir zeigen auf, dass der Osten – entgegen der Hypothese der „verlängerten Werkbank“ – nicht aufgrund einer Spezialisierung auf Vorprodukte weniger produktiv als der Westen ist. Obwohl Ostprodukte zu deutlich geringeren Preisen verkauft werden, können auch Preisunterschiede zwischen Ost- und Westfirmen den Produktivitätsrückstand nicht erklären. Stattdessen sind Faktoren, welche die physische Produktivität (technische Effizienz) von Unternehmen beeinflussen, entscheidend, um den Produktivitätsrückstand auf Unternehmensebene zu erklären.
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17.03.2022 • 6/2022
Price shock jeopardises recovery of German economy
Russia’s war in Ukraine is hitting the German economy primarily via an energy price shock, but also by disrupting trade flows and causing general uncertainty. At the same time, however, the economy is receiving a strong boost from the lifting of many pandemic restrictions. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that gross domestic product will increase by 3.1% in 2022. The consumer price index will be 4.8% higher than one year ago. The war affects the East German eco-nomy about as hard as the economy in Germany as a whole.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter, Mirko Titze, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capitalised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies required to green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer Programmes.
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14.12.2021 • 29/2021
German economy not yet immune to COVID 19 ‒ outlook clouded again
The current pandemic wave and supply bottlenecks cause the German economy to stagnate in winter. When infection rates go down in spring, private consumption will increase significantly. In addition, supply restrictions will be gradually reduced. As a result, the economy will regain momentum. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that German gross domestic product will increase by 3.5% (East Germany: 2.7%) in 2022, after 2.7% (East Germany: 2.1%) in the current year. Inflation is expected to decline only slowly.
Oliver Holtemöller
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14.10.2021 • 26/2021
East German economy less affected by supply bottlenecks than German economy as a whole, but lower vaccination rates pose risks – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2021 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Federal Statisti
Supply bottlenecks affect production in the manufacturing sector in East Germany somewhat less than in Germany as a whole. With 1.8%, the increase in Gross Domestic Product in eastern Germany in 2021 therefore is likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole (2.4%); this gap is likely to enlarge in 2022, when supply bottlenecks hamper less (East Germany: 3.6%, Germany 4.8%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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14.09.2021 • 23/2021
Production bottlenecks delay recovery
The German recovery made good progress over the summer 2021. However, bottlenecks in sea transport and the production of intermediate goods are weighing on world trade. The rise in raw material prices has prompted inflation rates to spike, and an increase in new infections is clouding the outlook again. A weak final quarter is therefore to be expected. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that German gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 2.2% in 2021 and 3.6% in 2022 (East Germany: 1.8% and 2.8%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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International Trade Barriers and Regional Employment: The Case of a No-Deal Brexit
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Oliver Holtemöller
Journal of Economic Structures,
No. 11,
2021
Abstract
We use the World Input–Output Database (WIOD) combined with regional sectoral employment data to estimate the potential regional employment effects of international trade barriers. We study the case of a no-deal Brexit in which imports to the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) would be subject to tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. First, we derive the decline in UK final goods imports from the EU from industry-specific international trade elasticities, tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. Using input–output analysis, we estimate the potential output and employment effects for 56 industries and 43 countries on the national level. The absolute effects would be largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK, such as Germany and France. However, there would also be large countries outside the EU which would be heavily affected via global value chains, such as China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) would be largest in Ireland followed by Belgium. In a second step, we split up the national effects on the NUTS-2 level for EU member states and additionally on the county (NUTS-3) level for Germany. The share of affected workers varies between 0.03% and 3.4% among European NUTS-2 regions and between 0.15% and 0.4% among German counties. A general result is that indirect effects via global value chains, i.e., trade in intermediate inputs, are more important than direct effects via final demand.
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30 Years after Reunification, Gross Domestic Product has Served its Purpose as an Indicator
Oliver Holtemöller
Wirtschaftsdienst,
Konferenzband "30 Jahre Deutsche Einheit", März
2021
Abstract
Der Vergleich der Lebensverhältnisse in Ost- und Westdeutschland orientiert sich häufig am Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Einwohner:in. Dieses Maß ist jedoch für sich genommen kein guter Wohlfahrtsindikator. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Einwohner:in in absehbarer Zukunft keine wesentliche weitere Angleichung der Wirtschaftskraft in Ost- und Westdeutschland mehr stattfinden wird. Denn die Altersstruktur Ostdeutschlands, d. h. das Verhältnis von Erwerbstätigenzahl zu Einwohnerzahl, ist ungünstiger als im Westen. Betrachtet man hingegen wichtige Wohlfahrtsindikatoren wie Konsummöglichkeiten, Lebenserwartung, Freizeit und Einkommensungleichheit, so sind die Lebensverhältnisse in Ost- und Westdeutschland ähnlicher als das Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Einwohner:in suggeriert. In den Debatten über den Aufholprozess Ostdeutschlands sollte daher stärker auf die Arbeitsproduktivität als Maß für die Wirtschaftskraft und auf andere Wohlfahrtsindikatoren als Maß für die Angleichung der Lebensverhältnisse abgestellt werden.
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The East-West-German Productivity Gap: Lessons from Firm-level Data?
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaftsdienst,
Konferenzband "30 Jahre Deutsche Einheit", März
2021
Abstract
Laut Volkswirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnung erreicht die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft auch 30 Jahre nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs nur 80 % der westdeutschen Arbeitsproduktivität. Dieser Unterschied in der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Arbeitsproduktivität geht Hand in Hand mit vielen der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Probleme, denen Ostdeutschland heute gegenübersteht. Um die Ursachen des aggregierten Produktivitätsgefälles zu verstehen, wird die neuere Literatur zum Ost-West-Gefälle diskutiert, die granulare Daten auf Firmen- und Produktebene verwendet. Die Evidenz zeigt die Relevanz von Produktivitätsunterschieden auf Firmenebene für die aggregierte Lücke deutlich und stellt gängige Hypothesen infrage, die aus aggregierten Daten abgeleitet werden.
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