Ceremonial Encapsulation and the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Germany
Iciar Dominguez Lacasa
Journal of Economic Issues,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
This inquiry employs ideas advanced by institutionalist thinker Paul Dale Bush to shed light on technology diffusion in Germany’s electrical generation and distribution industry. Research findings suggest that what Bush labeled as ceremonial dominance affects outcomes in technology selection. Evidence suggests that fossil fuel and nuclear technologies have remained favored by power producers despite the externalized environmental costs to society associated with their implementations. Advances in government policy have indeed created a framework that favorably accommodates renewable energy technologies. However, what Bush labeled ceremonial dominance is shown to persist and to contribute to ceremonial encapsulation. Consequently, renewable energy technologies have diffused only to the point that the powers behind the industry remain in dominant positions. Although there is measurable, incremental technological change in the electrical power industry, in light of the urgency of climate change problems, technologies supporting the electrical power system need to be selected more judiciously.
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The Political Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads
Stefan Eichler
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 46,
2014
Abstract
This paper analyzes the political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads using data for 27 emerging markets in the period 1996 to 2009. I find strong evidence that countries with parliamentary systems (as opposed to presidential regimes) and a low quality of governance face higher sovereign yield spreads, while the degree of democracy and elections play no significant role. A higher degree of political stability and the power to implement austerity measures significantly reduce sovereign yield spreads particularly in autocratic regimes, while no significant effect is detected for democratic countries. Overall, political determinants have a more pronounced impact on sovereign bond yield spreads in autocratic and closed regimes than in democratic and open countries.
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What Can We Learn from Bargaining Models about Union Power? The Decline in Union Power in Germany, 1992–2009
Boris Hirsch, Claus Schnabel
Manchester School,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength taking account of taxation, unemployment benefits, and the labour market situation and confronts this indicator with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power did not change much from 1992 to 2002 but fell markedly (by about one-third) from 2002 to 2007 in the aftermath of substantial labour market reforms.
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IT Use, Productivity, and Market Power in Banking
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
Information management is a core process in banking that can resolve information asymmetries and thereby help to mitigate competitive pressure. We test if the use of information technology (IT) contributes to bank output, and how IT-augmented bank productivity relates to differences in market power. Detailed bank-level information on the use of IT reveals a substantial upward bias in bank productivity estimates when ignoring banks’ IT expenditures. IT-augmented bank productivity correlates positively with Lerner markups. A mere increase in IT expenditures, however, reduces markups. Results hold across a range of bank output definitions and productivity estimation methods.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Banking Market Competition, Opaque Firms, and the Reallocation Component of Aggregate Growth
R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power–Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the impact of bank internationalization on domestic market power (Lerner index) and risk for German banks. Risk is measured by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is distressed. We distinguish the volume of foreign assets, the number of foreign countries, and different modes of foreign entry. Our analysis has three main results. First, higher market power is associated with lower risk. Second, holding assets in many countries reduce market power at home, but banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power. Third, bank internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk.
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Big Banks and Macroeconomic Outcomes: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence of Granularity
Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch, K. Russ, Monika Schnitzer
NBER Working Paper No. 19093,
2013
Abstract
Does the mere presence of big banks affect macroeconomic outcomes? In this paper, we develop a theory of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate fluctuations in the credit supply when the banking sector is highly concentrated. We empirically assess the relevance of these granular effects in banking using a linked micro-macro dataset of more than 80 countries for the years 1995-2009. The banking sector for many countries is indeed granular, as the right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. We then demonstrate granular effects in the banking sector on macroeconomic outcomes. The presence of big banks measured by high market concentration is associated with a positive and significant relationship between bank-level credit growth and aggregate growth of credit or gross domestic product.
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Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Theon van Dijk
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2013
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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The Role of Uncertainty in the Euro Crisis - A Reconsideration of Liquidity Preference Theory
Toralf Pusch
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2013
Abstract
With the world financial crisis came the rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy could play in remedying the situation. More recently, the Euro Crisis, with its mounting funding costs facing governments of a number of Southern EU member states and Ireland, has called this strategy into question. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate on the link between rising sovereign risk premia in the Eurozone and a major feature of the financial crisis - elevated uncertainty after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes' liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of rising uncertainty in financial markets and the detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign risk spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.
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