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Dr Carola Müller

Dr Carola Müller
Current Position

since 6/19

Research Affiliate

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

since 9/20

Senior Economist

CEMLA

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Research Interests
  • banking regulation
  • financial intermediation
  • banking competition

Carola Müller joined the institute as a Research Affiliate in June 2019. Her research focuses on banking regulation and banking competition.

Carola Müller holds the position of Senior Economist at Center for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA). Prior to that, she was a PhD student at IWH and a visiting researcher at Deutsche Bundesbank and Norges Bank. She received her bachelor's and master's degree from University of Göttingen.

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Dr Carola Müller
Dr Carola Müller
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Publications

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The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test

Christoffer Kok Carola Müller Steven Ongena Cosimo Pancaro

in: Journal of Financial Intermediation, January 2023

Abstract

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.

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Market Power and Risk: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Market

Carola Müller Felix Noth

in: Economics Letters, 2018

Abstract

We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.

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Working Papers

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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks

Carola Müller

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 15, 2022

Abstract

Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.

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May the Force Be with You: Exit Barriers, Governance Shocks, and Profitability Sclerosis in Banking

Michael Koetter Carola Müller Felix Noth Benedikt Fritz

in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No. 49, 2018

Abstract

We test whether limited market discipline imposes exit barriers and poor profitability in banking. We exploit an exogenous shock to the governance of government-owned banks: the unification of counties. County mergers lead to enforced government-owned bank mergers. We compare forced to voluntary bank exits and show that the former cause better bank profitability and efficiency at the expense of riskier financial profiles. Regarding real effects, firms exposed to forced bank mergers borrow more at lower cost, increase investment, and exhibit higher employment. Thus, reduced exit frictions in banking seem to unleash the economic potential of both banks and firms.

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