Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
Nr. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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