IWH-Signalansatz: Das gegenwärtige Finanzkrisenpotential in ausgewählten Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas und der Türkei
Hubert Gabrisch, Simone Lösel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 8,
2006
Abstract
Der hohe Anstieg der Rohölpreise, Gefahren im Zusammenhang mit dem Atomprogramm Irans sowie die Ungewißheit über die künftige Richtung der Politik der großen Zentralbanken haben in den zurückliegenden Monaten auf den internationalen Finanzmärkten eine größere Unsicherheit bei den Anlegern hervorgerufen. Das führte sowohl zu einer höheren Volatilität als auch zu einem Verfall der Kurse an den wichtigen Aktienmärkten. Auch einige wichtige Aktienindizes mittel- und osteuropäischer Länder folgten dem allgemeinen Abwärtstrend, während Staatstitel relativ konstant blieben. Da über mögliche Portfoliokorrekturen internationaler Anleger auch umfangreiche Kapitalabflüsse in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern ausgelöst werden könnten, stellt sich die Frage, ob aus diesen Entwicklungen für die mittel- und osteuropäischen Länder ein erhöhtes Potential für eine Finanzkrise entsteht. Mit Hilfe des IWH-Signalansatzes zur Analyse und Bewertung des Risikos von Finanzkrisen wurde überprüft, ob dies der Fall ist. Wie die Analyse der Frühwarnindikatoren zeigt, ist für die betrachteten Länder der Ausbruch einer Finanzkrise in den nächsten Monaten wenig wahrscheinlich. Durch eine stabile Wirtschaftspolitik und hohe Wachstumsraten, ein robustes Finanzsystem sowie günstige Wechselkursmechanismen sind diese Länder vor externen Angriffen geschützt. Anstiege des Indikators, die beispielsweise bei den baltischen Ländern zu beobachten sind, fielen allenfalls leicht aus. Im Falle der Slowakische Republik und Sloweniens signalisiert der Gesamtindikator sogar eine Entspannung. Für die Tschechische Republik, Polen und Ungarn weisen die Ergebnisse noch auf Probleme im Bankensektor hin. Diese Einschätzung gilt jedoch nicht für Rumänien und insbesondere nicht für die Türkei. Hier deutet der Gesamtindikator auf einen starken Anstieg des Risikopotentials und somit auf einen noch erheblichen wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsbedarf hin.
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Cross-border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Working Paper, No. 662,
Nr. 662,
2006
Abstract
This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given country that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances“) as a function of variables measuring common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in the distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the specification.
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Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Economic Journal,
Nr. 513,
2006
Abstract
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.
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Equity and Bond Market Signals as Leading Indicators of Bank Fragility
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 2,
2006
Abstract
We analyse the ability of the distance to default and subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance to default exhibits lead times of 6-18 months. Spreads have signal value close to problems only. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other information and find that their additional information content may be small but not insignificant. The results suggest that market indicators reduce type II errors relative to predictions based on accounting information only.
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Finanzverträge und Finanzintermediation. Grundlagen - Modelle - Übungen
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
,
2005
Abstract
Dieses Lehrbuch beschreibt - aus Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik - die Auswirkungen von Transaktions- und Informationskosten auf Finanzierungsbeziehungen, insbesondere die Möglichkeiten der Ausgestaltung von Finanzverträgen sowie das Verhalten von Banken. Darauf aufbauend können Erkenntnisse zur Wirkungsweise von Regulierungen im Bankensektor gewonnen werden. Das Buch bietet eine erste systematische Darstellung der Thematik in deutscher Sprache, die durch zahlreiche Übungsaufgaben mit Musterlösungen ergänzt wird.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Nr. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
Review of Finance,
Nr. 4,
2004
Abstract
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
Nr. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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