The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Artikel Lesen
Television Role Models and Fertility: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Peter Bönisch, Walter Hyll
SOEPpapers, Nr. 752,
Nr. 752,
2015
Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of television exposure on fertility. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in Germany after WWII. For topographical reasons, Western TV programs, which promoted one/no child families, could not be received in certain parts of East Germany. Using an IV approach, we find robust evidence that watching West German TV results in lower fertility. This conclusion is robust to alternative model specifications and data sets. Our results imply that individual fertility decisions are affected by role models or information about other ways of life promoted by media.
Artikel Lesen
Limited Investor Attention and the Mispricing of American Depositary Receipts
Stefan Eichler
Economics Letters,
Nr. 3,
2012
Abstract
I test whether more investor attention leads to a better exploitation of arbitrage opportunities and, in turn, to less mispricing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Using data on 536 stocks I find that more investor attention significantly reduces ADR mispricing.
Artikel Lesen
On the Economics of Ex-Post Transfers in a Federal State: A Mechanism Design Approach
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
WWDP, 95,
Nr. 95,
2008
Abstract
As a common feature in many federal states grants-in aid are payed to jurisdictions ex post, i.e. after local policy measures have chosen. We show that the central government cannot offer grants ex ante in a federal states with informational asymmetries as well as inter-temporal commitment problems. Local governments’ incentives to provide public goods are distorted if they rely on federal grants-in-aid offered ex post. Furthermore it becomes obvious that local governments are apt to substitute tax revenue for higher grants-in-aid if relevant local data are unobservable for the central government. To which extend ex post transfers mitigate local governments’ incentives crucially depends on the information structure predominant in the federation.
Artikel Lesen
Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
Artikel Lesen
