The Political Determinants of Government Bond Holdings
Stefan Eichler, Timo Plaga
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 5,
2017
Abstract
This paper analyzes the link between political factors and sovereign bond holdings of US investors in 60 countries over the 2003–2013 period. We find that, in general, US investors hold more bonds in countries with few political constraints on the government. Moreover, US investors respond to increased uncertainty around major elections by reducing government bond holdings. These effects are particularly significant in democratic regimes and countries with sound institutions, which enable effective implementation of fiscal consolidation measures or economic reforms. In countries characterized by high current default risk or a sovereign default history, US investors show a tendency towards favoring higher political constraints as this makes sovereign default more difficult for the government. Political instability, characterized by the fluctuation in political veto players, reduces US investment in government bonds. This effect is more pronounced in countries with low sovereign solvency.
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The Effects of Local Elections on National Military Spending: A Cross-country Study
Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun
Defence and Peace Economics,
Nr. 3,
2017
Abstract
In this paper, we study the domestic political determinants of military spending. Our conceptual framework suggests that power distribution over local and central governments influences the government provision of national public goods, in our context, military expenditure. Drawing on a large cross-country panel, we demonstrate that having local elections will decrease a country’s military expenditure markedly, controlling for other political and economic variables. According to our preferred estimates, a country’s military expenditure is on average 20% lower if its state government officials are locally elected, which is consistent with our theoretical prediction.
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The Political Determinants of Government Bond Holdings
Stefan Eichler, Timo Plaga
Abstract
This paper analyzes the link between political factors and sovereign bond holdings of US investors in 60 countries over the 2003-2013 period. We find that, in general, US investors hold more bonds in countries with few political constraints on the government. Moreover, US investors respond to increased uncertainty around major elections by reducing government bond holdings. These effects are particularly significant in democratic regimes and countries with sound institutions, which enable effective implementation of fiscal consolidation measures or economic reforms. In countries characterized by high current default risk or a sovereign default history, US investors show a tendency towards favoring higher political constraints as this makes sovereign default more difficult for the government. Political instability, characterized by the fluctuation in political veto players, reduces US investment in government bonds. This effect is more pronounced in countries with low sovereign solvency.
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Do Federal Reserve Bank Presidents’ Interest Rate Votes in the FOMC Follow an Electoral Cycle?
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Applied Economics Letters,
Nr. 9,
2016
Abstract
We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.
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Electoral Credit Supply Cycles Among German Savings Banks
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
IWH Online,
Nr. 11,
2015
Abstract
In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.
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25 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Economic Integration of East Germany
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
2014
Abstract
Citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) regained their civil liberties when the Berlin Wall fell 25 years ago. Since then, they have been able to travel freely and have been free to choose where to live and work. The fall of the Berlin Wall was quickly followed by preparations for German Unification at a speed unparalleled in history: the first free Volkskammer elections on 18 March 1990, the economic, monetary and social union on 1 July 1990, and finally, the unification of Germany when the GDR was included in the jurisdiction of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The integration of the economies of East and West Germany, however, has proven to be a drawn-out process.
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Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests
Vyacheslav Fos, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other nontargeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996–2010. To isolate the effect of the proxy contest, our empirical strategy uses within-firm variation in directors׳ exposure to the possibility of being voted out and exploits the predetermined schedule of staggered boards that allows only a fraction of directors to be nominated for election every year. We find that nominated directors relative to non-nominated ones lose 58% more seats on other boards. The evidence suggests the proxy-contest mechanism imposes a significant career cost on incumbent directors.
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The Political Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads
Stefan Eichler
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 46,
2014
Abstract
This paper analyzes the political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads using data for 27 emerging markets in the period 1996 to 2009. I find strong evidence that countries with parliamentary systems (as opposed to presidential regimes) and a low quality of governance face higher sovereign yield spreads, while the degree of democracy and elections play no significant role. A higher degree of political stability and the power to implement austerity measures significantly reduce sovereign yield spreads particularly in autocratic regimes, while no significant effect is detected for democratic countries. Overall, political determinants have a more pronounced impact on sovereign bond yield spreads in autocratic and closed regimes than in democratic and open countries.
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