Foreign Bank Entry, Credit Allocation and Lending Rates in Emerging Markets: Empirical Evidence from Poland
Hans Degryse, Olena Havrylchyk, Emilia Jurzyk, Sylwester Kozak
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 11,
2012
Abstract
Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Allocation de crédit et création de valeur par les banques : l’impact de la banque relationnelle en temps normal et en temps de crise
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Revue d'économie financière,
Nr. 106,
2012
Abstract
Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur l’allocation de crédit et la création de valeur par les banques. Il se concentre sur l’activité de banque relationnelle, à savoir le fait qu’une banque et un emprunteur se lancent dans de multiples interactions et que chacun des deux agents s’efforce d’obtenir des informations spécifiques sur l’autre. Il montre comment la banque relationnelle génère des coûts et des bénéfices à la fois pour les entreprises et pour les banques, mais qu’en règle générale, elle est source de valeur pour chacun d’eux. Néanmoins, l’incidence de ce type de relation est en grande partie fonction du contexte économique (période normale ou période de crise). Est aussi abordée la manière dont l’allocation de crédit, mesurée par la spécialisation sectorielle, affecte les entreprises et les banques. Enfin, l’examen de la littérature récente en matière de titrisation et de relation bancaire permet de mettre en évidence la manière dont la titrisation affecte les effets de la banque relationnelle.
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IWH-Industrieumfrage in Ostdeutschland zum Jahresauftakt 2012: Verarbeitendes Gewerbe nach Schwäche wieder zuversichtlicher
Cornelia Lang
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2012
Abstract
Im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe Ostdeutschlands liefen die Geschäfte im vergangenen Jahr recht gut. Viel Dynamik war in der ersten Jahreshälfte zu beobachten, und mehrheitlich erreichten die Geschäftsaktivitäten im Sommer einen Höhepunkt. Wie schon im Vorjahr sind die Geschäfte auch im Jahr 2011 vor allem für mittlere und große Unternehmen mit 250 und mehr Beschäftigten gut gelaufen. Die Ertragslage der Industrieunternehmen hat sich gegenüber dem Jahr 2010 leicht, bei den Investitionsgüterherstellern stärker verbessert. Die Unternehmen berichten
auch im Jahr 2011 wieder über positive Entwicklungen beim Umsatz. Zwei Drittel erzielten mehr Umsatz als 2010, 12% genauso viel und 21% weniger. Den kräftigsten Schub im Vergleich zum Vorjahr erreichten 2011 die Hersteller von Investitionsgütern. Nicht so gut lief es bei den Konsumgüterproduzenten, sie rechnen eine unterdurchschnittliche Entwicklung ab. Für das laufende Jahr 2012 sind die Erwartungen an die Umsatzentwicklung im ostdeutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbe insgesamt etwas zurückhaltender. Nur noch die Hälfte der Unternehmen geht von einem Zuwachs aus. Vergrößert hat sich vor allem die Gruppe derjenigen Befragten, die von gleichbleibendem Umsatz ausgehen. Die Beschäftigungspläne der Unternehmen für das Jahr 2012 sind per saldo im Plus. 36% der Unternehmen wollen Personal einstellen und 54% den aktuellen Bestand beibehalten.
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Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Reint E. Gropp, H. Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 6,
2011
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.
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Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition
Hans Degryse, Luc Laeven, Steven Ongena
Review of Finance,
Nr. 2,
2009
Abstract
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.
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A Lesson Learned? Pre- and Post-Crisis Entry Decisions in Turkish Banking
H. Evren Damar
Contemporary Economic Policy,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
This study looks at the determinants of entry by Turkish banks into local markets during the periods before and after the crisis of 2000–2001. Motivated by a theoretical model of entry, results of fixed-effects logit regressions suggest that there has been a change in the geographical diversification strategies of Turkish banks. It appears that the dominance of strategic concerns, such as competing with banks of similar size, has diminished, while economic concerns, such as incumbent characteristics and cost considerations, have become more important. Overall, the postcrisis restructuring policies seem to have led to improved decision making in the sector.
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An Assessment of Bank Merger Success in Germany
Michael Koetter
German Economic Review,
Nr. 2,
2008
Abstract
German banks have experienced a merger wave since the early 1990s. However, the success of bank mergers remains a continuous matter of debate.This paper suggests a taxonomy to evaluate post-merger performance on the basis of cost and profit efficiency (CE and PE). I identify successful mergers as those that fulfill simultaneously two criteria. First, merged institutes must exhibit efficiency levels above the average of non-merging banks. Second, banks must exhibit efficiency changes between merger and evaluation year above efficiency changes of non-merging banks. I assess the post-merger performance up to 11 years after the mergers and relate it to the transfer of skills, the adequacy to merge distressed banks and the role of geographical distance. Roughly every second merger is a success in terms of either CE or PE. The margin of success in terms of CE is narrow, as efficiency differentials between merging and non-merging banks are around 1 and 2 percentage points. PE performance is slightly larger. More importantly, mergers boost in particular the change in PE, thus indicating persistent improvements of merging banks to improve the ability to generate profits.
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