Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition
Hans Degryse, Luc Laeven, Steven Ongena
Review of Finance,
Nr. 2,
2009
Abstract
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.
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A Lesson Learned? Pre- and Post-Crisis Entry Decisions in Turkish Banking
H. Evren Damar
Contemporary Economic Policy,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
This study looks at the determinants of entry by Turkish banks into local markets during the periods before and after the crisis of 2000–2001. Motivated by a theoretical model of entry, results of fixed-effects logit regressions suggest that there has been a change in the geographical diversification strategies of Turkish banks. It appears that the dominance of strategic concerns, such as competing with banks of similar size, has diminished, while economic concerns, such as incumbent characteristics and cost considerations, have become more important. Overall, the postcrisis restructuring policies seem to have led to improved decision making in the sector.
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An Assessment of Bank Merger Success in Germany
Michael Koetter
German Economic Review,
Nr. 2,
2008
Abstract
German banks have experienced a merger wave since the early 1990s. However, the success of bank mergers remains a continuous matter of debate.This paper suggests a taxonomy to evaluate post-merger performance on the basis of cost and profit efficiency (CE and PE). I identify successful mergers as those that fulfill simultaneously two criteria. First, merged institutes must exhibit efficiency levels above the average of non-merging banks. Second, banks must exhibit efficiency changes between merger and evaluation year above efficiency changes of non-merging banks. I assess the post-merger performance up to 11 years after the mergers and relate it to the transfer of skills, the adequacy to merge distressed banks and the role of geographical distance. Roughly every second merger is a success in terms of either CE or PE. The margin of success in terms of CE is narrow, as efficiency differentials between merging and non-merging banks are around 1 and 2 percentage points. PE performance is slightly larger. More importantly, mergers boost in particular the change in PE, thus indicating persistent improvements of merging banks to improve the ability to generate profits.
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Does Post-Crisis Restructuring Decrease the Availability of Banking Services? The Case of Turkey
H. Evren Damar
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 9,
2007
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between post-crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches in Turkey. Using a unique data set, the analysis addresses several issues related to the impact of market characteristics on branching behavior. The findings suggest that sales of failed institutions by the central authority lead to branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer does not have a prior presence. Contrary to popular belief, mergers between healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets.
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The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 3,
2007
Abstract
How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.
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Effectiveness of Competition Law: A Panel Data Analysis
Franz Kronthaler
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 7,
2007
Abstract
The paper explores what macroeconomic factors can tell us about the effectiveness of recently enacted national competition laws. Qualitative evidence suggests that numerous countries fall short in implementing competition law. Furthermore, there seems to be significant differences between countries. To examine what factors might contribute to the explanation of effectiveness of competition law panel regression analysis is used. The results indicate that the level of economic development matters, however the institutional learning curve is also relevant. Furthermore, larger countries should be more concerned with competition advocacy activities than smaller countries and it seems to be the case that the problem of capture of competition law is serious in countries with high levels of corruption.
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Repercusiones de la integración y consolidación de los sectores bancarios europeos sobre la innovación y las actividades de los emprendedores
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Maria Fabiana Penas
Papeles de Economía Española,
Nr. 110,
2006
Abstract
En este artículo se analiza si el programa de intensificación de la integración del sector financier europeo puede dañar a la innovación y al crecimiento en Europa. En particular, es preciso resaltar los problemas que dicha integración financiera puede ocasionar sobre los últimos avances en materia de desarrollo empresarial. La integración financiera, al intensificar la competencia y la consolidación del sector bancario europeo, podría poner en peligro la financiación procedente de las fuentes más innovadoras. Sin embargo, al sopesar los datos actuales, la conclusión es que estos problemas serían, a lo sumo, transitorios.
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Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing an Effective Competition Regime: Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine, and South Africa for developing countries
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 6,
2006
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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