The Causal Effect of Watching TV on Material Aspirations: Evidence from the “Valley of the Innocent”
Walter Hyll, Lutz Schneider
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
Nr. 86,
2013
Abstract
The paper addresses the question of whether TV consumption has an impact on material aspirations. We exploit a natural experiment that took place during the period in which Germany was divided. Owing to geographical reasons TV programs from the Federal Republic of Germany could not be received in all parts of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore a natural variation occurred in exposure to West German television. We find robust evidence that watching TV is positively correlated with aspirations. Our identification strategy implies a causal relationship running from TV to aspirations. This conclusion resists various sets of alternative specifications and samples.
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The Causal Effect of Watching TV on Material Aspirations: Evidence from the “Valley of the Innocent”
Walter Hyll, Lutz Schneider
Abstract
The paper addresses the question of whether TV consumption has an impact on material aspirations. We exploit a natural experiment that took place during the period in which Germany was divided. Owing to geographical reasons, TV programs from the Federal Republic of Germany could not be received in all parts of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, a natural variation occurred in exposure to West German television. We find robust evidence that watching TV is positively correlated with aspirations. Our identification strategy implies a causal relationship running from TV to aspirations. This conclusion resists various sets of alternative specifications and samples.
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Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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