Regulations, Institutions and Income Smoothing by Managing Technical Reserves: International Evidence from the Insurance Industry
Chrysovalantis Gaganis, Iftekhar Hasan, Fotios Pasiouras
Omega,
Nr. 3,
2016
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of technical reserves in the income smoothing behavior of insurance companies. This is one of the first attempts in the literature to trace such relationship in the insurance industry, especially at a multi-country setting. The experience of 770 insurance firms operating in 87 countries over the period 2000–2009 reveals that there is a significant evidence of income smoothing. The paper also finds that institutional characteristics, e.g., the rule of law, common law legal origin, economic freedom, and regulations relating to technical provisions and supervisory power constrain income smoothing but other factors such as capital requirements, tax deductibility of provisions, auditing, and corporate governance do not have a significant effect.
Artikel Lesen
Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
Artikel Lesen
Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation
Thomas J. Chemmanur, Elena Loutskina, Xuan Tian
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2014
Abstract
We analyze how corporate venture capital (CVC) differs from independent venture capital (IVC) in nurturing innovation in entrepreneurial firms. We find that CVC-backed firms are more innovative, as measured by their patenting outcome, although they are younger, riskier, and less profitable than IVC-backed firms. Our baseline results continue to hold in a propensity score matching analysis of IPO firms and a difference-in-differences analysis of the universe of VC-backed entrepreneurial firms. We present evidence consistent with two possible underlying mechanisms: CVC's greater industry knowledge due to the technological fit between their parent firms and entrepreneurial firms and CVC's greater tolerance for failure.
Artikel Lesen
Transfer Payments without Growth: Evidence for German Regions, 1992–2005
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
Nr. 4,
2013
Abstract
After German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 4% of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states (i.e. those which were formerly part of the German Democratic Republic). We show that, between 1992 and 2005, infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies had a negative net impact on regional economic growth and convergence. This result is robust to both the specification of spatially weighted control variables and the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for the endogeneity of subsidies. Our results suggest that regional redistribution was ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles.
Artikel Lesen
Die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance deutscher Banken seit 1950
R. H. Schmidt, Felix Noth
Bankhistorisches Archiv,
Nr. 2,
2011
Abstract
The present paper gives an overview of the development of Corporate Governance of German banks since the 1950s. The focus will be on economic analysis. The most striking changes in Corporate Governance occurred with the ownership structure of commercial banks, in particular with the major joint-stock banks. In addition to that, the capital market has become a core element of Corporate Governance in all major German banks, which have replaced their prior concentration on the interests of a broadly defined circle of stakeholders by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, with savings banks and cooperative cooperative banks, Corporate Governance has remained unchanged for the most part. Exceptions to this are the regional state banks: in their case, after they had turned away from traditional business models and in particular following the discontinuation of the guarantee obligation, the problems of their Corporate Governance, which were already discernible beforehand, became quite obvious. If you include the financial crisis, beginning in 2007, in the analysis, it becomes evident that it was precisely a Corporate Governance unilaterally geared to shareholders’ interest and the efficiency of the capital market that materially contributed to the evolution and widening of the crisis.
Artikel Lesen
Human Capital Investment, New Firm Creation and Venture Capital
Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms' willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.
Artikel Lesen
Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 11,
2009
Abstract
We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential - that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.
Artikel Lesen
Organization and Financing of Innovation, and the Choice between Corporate and Independent Venture Capital
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 6,
2009
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of competition on the optimal organization and financing structures in innovation-intensive industries. We show that as an optimal response to competition, firms may choose external organization structures established in collaboration with specialized start-ups where they provide start-up financing from their own resources. As the intensity of the competition to innovate increases, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry. We also show that as the level of competition increases, firms provide a higher level of financing for externally organized projects in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Our results help explain the emergence of organization and financing arrangements such as CVC and strategic alliances, where large established firms organize their projects in collaboration with external specialized firms and provide financing for externally organized projects from their own internal resources.
Artikel Lesen
Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
Artikel Lesen
Local Taxes and Capital Structure Choice
Reint E. Gropp
International Tax and Public Finance,
Nr. 1,
2002
Abstract
This paper investigates the question of taxation and capital structure choice in Germany. Germany represents an excellent case study for investigating the question of whether and to what extent taxes influence the debt-equity decision of firms, because the relative tax burdens on debt and equity vary greatly across communities. German communities levy local taxes on profits and long-term debt payments in addition to personal and corporate taxes on the federal level. A stylized model is presented incorporating these taxes. The model shows that local taxes create substantial incentives for firms to use debt financing. Furthermore, the paper empirically investigates the effect of local business taxes on the share of debt used to finance incremental investments by German firms. I find that local taxes significantly influence the capital structure choice of firms, controlling for a large number of other factors. In an extensive sensitivity analysis the tax effect are found to be robust across several different specifications.
Artikel Lesen