Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
Nr. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Business Cycle Volatility in Germany
Claudia M. Buch, J. Doepke, C. Pierdzioch
German Economic Review,
2004
Abstract
Stylized facts suggest that output volatility in OECD countries has declined in recent years. The causes and the nature of this decline have so far been analyzed mainly for the United States. In this paper, we analyze whether structural changes in output volatility in Germany can be detected. We report evidence that output volatility has declined in Germany. It is difficult to answer the question whether this decline in output volatility reflects good economic and monetary policy or merely ‘good luck’.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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