We investigate whether a firm’s exposure to climate change, as proxied by disclosures during quarterly earnings conference calls, provides forward-looking information to investors regarding the long-term association of stock prices with current earnings and the book values of equity. Following a key regulatory mandate around the formation of the cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions related to climate change, firms’ climate change exposure decreases the association between current earnings and stock prices while increasing the relevance of book values of equity (i.e., historical earnings). However, these relationships flip when the sentiment around climate change exposure is negative, suggesting that the risks related to climate change exposure provide forward-looking information to investors when they evaluate the ability of current earnings to predict firm values. Such a relationship is stronger for new economy firms and is sensitive to conservative accounting. We also observe that the inclusion of climate change disclosure to our models improves the joint ability of earnings and book values to predict stock prices.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.