Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe
Manuela Storz, Michael Koetter, Ralph Setzer, Andreas Westphal
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 13,
2017
Abstract
We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.
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Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps
Stefano Colonnello
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 6,
2017
Abstract
I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.
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Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison
Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
Applied Economics Letters,
Nr. 7,
2017
Abstract
The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.
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State Aid and Guarantees in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, Lena Tonzer
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, governments massively intervened in the banking sector by providing liquidity assistance and capital support to banks in distress. This helped stabilize the financial system in the short run. However, public bailouts also bear the risk of longer-term distortions, for example, by affecting bailout expectations of banks. In this chapter, the authors first provide an overview of state aid interventions during the recent crisis episode. The third section then analyzes the effects of state aid on financial stability from a theoretical view. This is followed by the description of results obtained from empirical studies. The link between the provision of state aid and politics is discussed in the section “Institutional Design and Policy Implications”. Finally, in the section “The European Banking Union” the authors describe the elements of the European Banking Union meant to resolve and restructure banks in distress and to lower the need for public intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the new design.
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Preisverzerrungen Fehlanzeige – Keine Hinweise für Effekte der Bankenrettung in den USA
Felix Noth, Karolin Vogt
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 4,
2016
Abstract
Im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 rückte die Kontroverse um staatliche Notrettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor verstärkt ins Blickfeld. Diese Programme haben das Ziel, den Finanzsektor und somit auch realwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu stabilisieren. Dem stehen die finanziellen Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat sowie mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur gegenüber. Dieser Artikel diskutiert mögliche Preisverzerrungen durch das Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in den USA aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags, der die langfristigen indirekten Effekte des Programms innerhalb der Gruppe der nicht unterstützten Banken untersucht. Hierbei zeigen sich keine Hinweise dafür, dass das Programm zur Bankenrettung zu nachhaltigen Unterschieden im Bankenwettbewerb nach 2010 geführt hat. Die Zinsmargen von Banken mit einer höheren Rettungswahrscheinlichkeit stiegen nur in der direkten Folgezeit von TARP, d. h. im Jahr 2010 an. Ein signifikanter Anstieg des Kredit- und Depotwachstum der Banken für den Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2013 kann nicht verzeichnet werden.
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Informal or Formal Financing? Evidence on the Co-Funding of Chinese Firms
Hans Degryse, Liping Lu, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
2016
Abstract
Different modes of external finance provide heterogeneous benefits for the borrowing firms. Informal finance offers informational advantages whereas formal finance is scalable. Using unique survey data from China, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms but lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Co-funding, thereby simultaneously using the informational advantage of informal finance and the scalability of formal finance, is therefore the optimal choice for small firms.
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and dif-ferent compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt. We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap (CDS) contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model’s predictions.
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CEO Political Preference and Corporate Tax Sheltering
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Xian Sun, Qiang Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2016
Abstract
We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs' tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.
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Nested Models and Model Uncertainty
Alexander Kriwoluzky, Christian A. Stoltenberg
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Nr. 2,
2016
Abstract
Uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models is a concern for optimal policy when policy prescriptions from those models differ. The standard procedure is to specify a prior over the parameter space, ignoring the special status of submodels (e.g., those resulting from zero restrictions). Following Sims (2008, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32, 2460–2475), we treat nested submodels as probability models, and we formalize a procedure that ensures that submodels are not discarded too easily and do matter for optimal policy. For the United States, we find that optimal policy based on our procedure leads to substantial welfare gains compared to the standard procedure.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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