Banking Market Competition, Opaque Firms, and the Reallocation Component of Aggregate Growth
R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
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Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?
Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 4356, August,
2013
Abstract
We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.
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Financial Constraints of Private Firms and Bank Lending Behavior
Patrick Behr, L. Norden, Felix Noth
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 9,
2013
Abstract
We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
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Taxes, Banks and Financial Stability
Reint E. Gropp
SAFE White Paper Series 6,
August
2013
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, numerous new taxes on financial institutions have been discussed or implemented around the world. This paper discusses the connection between the incidence of the taxes, their incentive effects, and policy makers’ objectives. Combining basic insights from banking theory with standard models of tax incidence shows that the incidence of such taxes will disproportionately fall on small and medium size enterprises. The arguments presented suggest it is unlikely that the taxes will have a beneficial impact on financial stability or raise significant amounts of revenue without increasing the cost of capital to bank dependent firms significantly.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper,
Nr. 2,
2013
Abstract
Der Beitrag wurde anlässlich des gemeinsamen Workshops des Conseil d'Analyse Économique (CAE) und des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zum Thema fiskalische und ökonomische Integration des Euroraums verfasst. Er diskutiert die makroökonomischen Wirkungen einer Bankenunion und mögliche Ausgestaltungsvarianten vor dem Hintergrund der aktuell diskutierten Vorschläge.
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power–Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Review of Finance,
Nr. 4,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the impact of bank internationalization on domestic market power (Lerner index) and risk for German banks. Risk is measured by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is distressed. We distinguish the volume of foreign assets, the number of foreign countries, and different modes of foreign entry. Our analysis has three main results. First, higher market power is associated with lower risk. Second, holding assets in many countries reduce market power at home, but banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power. Third, bank internationalization is only weakly related to bank risk.
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Makroökonomische Faktoren und mikroökonomische Risiken von Banken
Claudia M. Buch, S. Eickmeier, Esteban Prieto
Ökonomenstimme,
2010
Abstract
Die jüngste Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise hat gezeigt, dass Entwicklungen im Bankensektor und makroökonomische Entwicklungen oftmals sehr eng miteinander verwoben sind. Banken reagieren auf eine expansive Geldpolitik, in dem sie ihre Kreditvergabe ausweiten und dabei unter Umständen höhere Risiken eingehen; umgekehrt reagiert die Geldpolitik auf Liquiditätsengpässe im Bankensektor, in dem sie zusätzliche Liquidität bereitstellt. Diese und andere Anpassungsmuster spielen sich aber nicht nur auf aggregierter Ebene ab; vielmehr liegen ihnen eine Vielzahl von zum Teil sehr unterschiedlichen Anpassungsmustern auf der Ebene der einzelnen Bank zu Grunde. Banken unterscheiden sich beispielsweise im Grad ihrer Abhängigkeit der Refinanzierung über den Interbankenmarkt, sie sind in ihrem Geschäft Zinsänderungsrisiken in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß aufgesetzt, und sie sind unterschiedlich stark im Ausland engagiert und damit von makroökonomischen Entwicklungen im Inland abhängig.
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Does It Pay to Have Friends? Social Ties and Executive Appointments in Banking
Allen N. Berger, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Klaus Schaeck
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
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