Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Prekäre Einkommenslagen in Deutschland: Ein Ost-West-Vergleich 1996 bis 2002
Herbert S. Buscher, Juliane Parys
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 2,
2006
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht die Verteilung der äquivalenzgewichteten Nettoeinkommen von Haushalten und Lebensgemeinschaft in West- und Ostdeutschland für die Zeit von 1996 bis 2002 auf der Grundlage der Daten des Mikrozensus. Die Untersuchung gliedert sich in einen deskriptiven Teil, der eindimensionale Maße zur Einkommensverteilung und zur Messung der Ungleichheit diskutiert, und in einen zweiten Teil, in dem auf der Basis eines Logit-Modells Determinanten bestimmt werden, die für prekäre Lebens- und Einkommenslagen ursächlich sein können. Ein besonderes Gewicht wird hierbei auf unterschiedliche Lebensformen und die Anzahl der Kinder gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein deutlich höheres Armutsrisiko für Lebensgemeinschaften bzw. Familien mit Kindern im Vergleich zu kinderlosen Paaren.
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Spillover Effects and R&D-Cooperations - The Influence of Market Structure
Anita Wölfl
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 122,
2000
Abstract
This paper examines empirically the role of market structure for the influence of spill-over effects on R&D-cooperations. The results of a microeconometric analysis, based on firm data on innovation, let in general presume that with intensified competition also the influence of spillovers on R&D-cooperation increases. However, competition seems to induce firms to search for effective firm-specific appropriation facilities first. Spillovers that are sufficiently high such that the internalisation effect from R&D-cooperation more than outweighs the competitive effect from research, only arise whenever firms are not able to protect their research results through any appropriation facility. Additionally, there is some evidence that spillover effects may even hinder firms from cooperating in R&D when there is intensive competition on the research stage.
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