The German Model of Industrial Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Nr. 4,
2022
Abstract
We give an overview of the "German model" of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives' minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action.
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Economic Preferences for Risk-Taking and Financing Costs
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Maria Iosifidi, Chris Tsoumas
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
We hypothesize and empirically establish that economic preferences for risk-taking in different subnational regions affect firm financing costs. We study this hypothesis by hand-matching firms' regions worldwide with the corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. We first show that higher regional risk-taking is positively associated with several measures of firm risk and investments. Subsequently, our baseline results show that credit and bond pricing increase when risk-taking preferences increase. For the loan of average size and maturity a one-standard-deviation increase in regional risk-taking increases interest expense by $0.54 million USD. We also find that these results are demand (firm)-driven and stronger for firms with more local shareholders.
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Die Schließung von Polizeiposten führt zu einem Anstieg der Diebstahlkriminalität
André Diegmann, Sebastian Blesse
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2023
Abstract
Die Zusammenlegung von Polizeikräften durch die Schließung von Polizeiposten ist ein vielbeobachtetes Phänomen in entwickelten Volkswirtschaften. Polizeiposten stellen einen bedeutenden und sichtbaren Teil der öffentlichen Infrastruktur dar. Als Ergebnis der vorliegenden Studie zeigt sich, dass die Schließung von Polizeiposten zu einem Anstieg von Autodiebstählen und Wohnungseinbrüchen führt. Diese Resultate können nicht durch Verdrängungseffekte in andere Regionen, veränderte Einsatzstrategien der Polizeieinheiten oder eine geringere Inhaftierung von Kriminellen erklärt werden. Vielmehr sind sie konsistent mit einer veränderten Wahrnehmung der Aufklärungswahrscheinlichkeit. Somit zeigt sich, dass die Sichtbarkeit von lokalen Polizeiposten zur Abschreckung und demnach zur Kriminalitätsbekämpfung beiträgt.
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The Labor Effects of Judicial Bias in Bankruptcy
Aloisio Araujo, Rafael Ferreira, Spyridon Lagaras, Flavio Moraes, Jacopo Ponticelli, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2023
Abstract
We study the effect of judicial bias favoring firm continuation in bankruptcy on the labor market outcomes of employees by exploiting the random assignment of cases across courts in the State of São Paulo in Brazil. Employees of firms assigned to courts that favor firm continuation are more likely to stay with their employer, but they earn, on average, lower wages three to five years after bankruptcy. We discuss several potential mechanisms that can rationalize this result, and provide evidence that imperfect information about outside options in the local labor market and adjustment costs associated with job change play an important role.
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Political Ideology and International Capital Allocation
Elisabeth Kempf, Mancy Luo, Larissa Schäfer, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2023
Abstract
Does investors’ political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings—syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds—to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.
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What Does Codetermination Do?
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
ILR Review,
Nr. 4,
2022
Abstract
The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.
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Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data
Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, Benjamin Schoefer
Review of Economics and Statistics,
Nr. 1,
2023
Abstract
We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers in temp agency work arrangements. We leverage unique Argentinian administrative data that feature links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We estimate that a high-wage user firm that pays a regular worker a 10% premium pays a temp worker on average only a 4.9% premium, compared to what these workers would earn in a low-wage user firm in their respective work arrangements—the midpoint between the benchmarks for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market (zero).
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalisation of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Economic Inquiry,
Nr. 3,
2022
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.
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