We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.

We investigate how a state's political corruption affects a resident firm's debt contracting and how a change in anti-corruption regulation alters the relation between corruption and loan contracting. Firms in more corrupt states are associated with significantly higher loan spreads and tighter loan covenants than firms in less corrupt states. Furthermore, the passage of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision amplifies the conhcerns of banks about the detrimental impact of corruption due to the increased exposure of firms to whistleblowing threats. The detrimental impact of corruption is further amplified when a state has a higher level of whistleblowing involvement, when firms are located in more corrupt states or closer to the SEC office, and when the bank's state is less corrupt than the firm's state. In general, we document the externality of corruption in the debt financing of firms and the response of banks to changes in regulation.

Zur Erinnerung: Nach Jahren von Inflationsraten nahe null war die Inflationsrate in Deutschland 2022 nach der Corona-Pandemie und dem Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine auf knapp 7% gestiegen, ähnlich hoch wie zur Energiekrise 1973/74. Die Gründe dafür sind bekannt: expansive Geld- und Finanzpolitik sowie steigende Energiepreise und Nachholeffekte beim Konsum, verbunden mit Lieferkettenproblemen gerade im Handel mit China. Seitdem haben Zentralbanken wie die EZB eine weiche Landung hingelegt. Ohne große Verluste beim Wachstum (zumindest global gesehen) wurde die Inflationsrate auf 1,6% im September 2024 gedrückt. Ein großer Erfolg?

Utilizing near real-time QuickBooks data from over 1.6 million small businesses and a targeted survey, this paper highlights the critical role credit card financing plays for small business activity. We examine a two year period beginning in January of 2021. A turbulent period during which, credit card usage by small U.S. businesses nearly doubled, interest payments rose by 60%, and delinquencies reached 2.8%. We find, first, monthly credit card payments were up to three times higher than loan payments during this time. Second, we use targeted surveys of these small businesses to establish credit cards as a key financing source in response to firm-level shocks, such as uncertain cash flows and overdue invoices. Third, we establish the importance of credit cards as an important financial transmission mechanism. Following the Federal Reserve’s rate hikes in early 2022, banks cut credit card supply, leading to a 15.75% drop in balances and a 10% decline in revenue growth, as well as a 1.5% decrease in employment growth among U.S. small businesses. These higher rates also rendered interest payments unsustainable for many, contributing to half of the observed increase in delinquencies. Lastly, a simple heterogeneous firm model with a cash-in-hand constraint illustrates the significant macroeconomic impact of credit card financing on small business activity.

We study whether and how EU banks comply with tighter macroprudential policy (MPP). Observing contractual details for more than one million securitized loans, we document an elusive risk-shifting response by EU banks in reaction to tighter loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions between 2009 and 2022. Our staggered difference-in-differences reveals that banks respond to these MPP measures at the portfolio level by issuing new loans after LTV shocks that are smaller, have shorter maturities, and show a higher collateral valuation while holding constant interest rates. Instead of contracting aggregate lending as intended by tighter MPP, banks increase the number and total volume of newly issued loans. Importantly, new loans finance especially properties in less liquid markets identified by a new European Real Estate Index (EREI), which we interpret as a novel, elusive form of risk-shifting.

This paper examines how firms’ exposure to supply chain disruptions (SCD) affects firm outcomes in the European Union (EU). Exploiting heterogeneous responses to workplace closures imposed by sourcing countries during the pandemic as a shock to SCD, we provide empirical evidence that firms in industries relying more heavily on foreign inputs experience a significant decline in sales compared to other firms. We document that external finance, particularly bank financing, plays a critical role in mitigating the effects of SCD. Furthermore, we highlight the unique importance of bank loans for small and solvent firms. Our findings also indicate that highly diversified firms and those sourcing inputs from less distant partners are less vulnerable to SCD.

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.