Technical Optimum of Bank Liquidity Creation
Iftekhar Hasan, Jean-Loup Soula
Revue Economique,
Nr. 3,
2022
Abstract
This paper generates a technical optimum of bank liquidity creation benchmark by tracing an efficient frontier in liquidity creation (bank intermediation) and questions why some banks are more efficient than others in such activities. Evidence reveals that medium size banks are most correlated to efficient frontier. Small (large) banks—focused on traditional banking activities—are found to be the most (least) efficient in creating liquidity in on-balance sheet items whereas large banks—involved in non-traditional activities—are found to be most efficient in off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Additionally, the liquidity efficiency of small banks is more resilient during the 2007-2008 financial crisis relative to other banks.
Artikel Lesen
Macroprudential Policy and Intra-Group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil
Chris Becker, Matias Ossandon Busch, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Corporate Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.
Artikel Lesen
Covered Bonds and Bank Portfolio Rebalancing
Jin Cao, Ragnar E. Juelsrud, Talina Sondershaus
Norges Bank Working Papers,
Nr. 6,
2021
Abstract
We use administrative and supervisory data at the bank and loan level to investigate the impact of the introduction of covered bonds on the composition of bank balance sheets and bank risk. Covered bonds, despite being collateralized by mortgages, lead to a shift in bank lending from mortgages to corporate loans. Young and low-rated firms in particular receive more credit, suggesting that overall credit risk increases. At the same time, we find that total balance sheet liquidity increases. We identify the channel in a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence: Banks with low initial liquidity and banks with sufficiently high risk-adjusted return on firm lending drive the results.
Artikel Lesen
Crises and Rescues: Liquidity Transmission Through Global Banks
Michael Koetter, Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch
International Journal of Central Banking,
Nr. 4,
2018
Abstract
This paper shows that global banks transmit liquidity shocks via their network of foreign affiliates. We use the (unexpected) access of German banks' affiliates located in the United States to the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility. We condition on the parent banks' U.S. dollar funding needs in order to examine how affiliates located outside the United States adjusted their balance sheets when the U.S. affiliate of the same parent tapped into TAF liquidity. Our research has three main findings. First, affiliates tied to parents with higher U.S. dollar funding needs expanded their foreign assets during periods of active TAF borrowing. Second, the overall effects are driven by affiliates located in financial centers. Third, U.S.- dollar-denominated lending particularly increased in response to the TAF program.
Artikel Lesen
The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Review of Finance,
Nr. 2,
2014
Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
Artikel Lesen
What Drives Banking Sector Fragility in the Eurozone? Evidence from Stock Market Data
Stefan Eichler, Karol Sobanski
Journal of Common Market Studies,
Nr. 4,
2012
Abstract
This article explores the determinants of banking sector fragility in the eurozone. For this purpose, a stock-market-based banking sector fragility indicator is calculated for eight member countries from 1999 to 2009 using the Merton model (1974). Using a panel framework, it is found that the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the banking sector and the intensity of banking regulation all have an effect on banking sector fragility in the eurozone.
Artikel Lesen
The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding Management
Elena Loutskina
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 3,
2011
Abstract
This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.
Artikel Lesen
