Nothing Special about an Allowance for Corporate Equity: Evidence from Italian Banks
Dennis Dreusch, Felix Noth, Peter Reichling
Journal of International Money and Finance,
February
2025
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.
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12.01.2024 • 2/2024
Grüne Transformation und Schuldenbremse: Implikationen zusätzlicher Investitionen für öffentliche Finanzen und privaten Konsum
Das deutsche Klimaschutzgesetz sieht unter anderem vor, dass die Treibhausgas-Emissionen in Deutschland bis zum Jahr 2030 um 65% gegenüber dem Jahr 1990 verringert werden. Die für dieses Ziel erforderlichen grünen Investitionen dürften jährlich etwa 2,5% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt ausmachen. Die damit verbundenen zusätzlichen staatlichen Ausgaben für öffentliche Investitionen und Fördermaßnahmen werden nach der mittelfristigen Projektion des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) nicht aus dem zu erwartenden Steueraufkommen finanzierbar sein. Daher ist damit zu rechnen, dass die steuerliche Belastung der Haushalte zunehmen und der private Konsum entsprechend gedämpft wird, sofern an der gegenwärtigen Form der Schuldenbremse und den Treibhausgasminderungszielen gleichzeitig festgehalten wird.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Datenschutz
Datenschutzerklärung Wir nehmen den Schutz Ihrer persönlichen Daten sehr ernst und behandeln Ihre personenbezogenen Daten vertraulich und entsprechend der gesetzlichen…
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IWH-Tarif-Check
IWH-Tarif-Check Der IWH-Tarif-Check analysiert die realen Einkommenswirkungen aktueller Tarifabschlüsse in Deutschland. Er bereinigt die nominalen Lohnsteigerungen um Effekte der…
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Interactions Between Bank Levies and Corporate Taxes: How is Bank Leverage Affected?
Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking and Finance,
September
2020
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn insignificant. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Profit Shifting and Tax‐rate Uncertainty
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Panagiotis I. Karavitis
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,
5-6
2020
Abstract
Using firm‐level data for 1,084 parent firms in 24 countries and for 9,497 subsidiaries in 54 countries, we show that tax‐motivated profit shifting is larger among subsidiaries in countries that have stable corporate tax rates over time. Our findings further suggest that firms move away from transfer pricing and toward intragroup debt shifting that has lower adjustment costs. Our results are robust to several identification methods and respecifications, and they highlight the important role of tax‐rate uncertainty in the profit‐shifting decision while pointing to an adjustment away from more costly transfer pricing and toward debt shifting.
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Interactions between Bank Levies and Corporate Taxes: How is the Bank Leverage Affected?
Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?
Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Julia Cagé, William R. Kerr
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
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Editorial
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
In letzter Zeit stehen die Finanzprobleme von Euroländern wie Griechenland im Zentrum der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit, während die finanzielle Schieflage der Städte und Gemeinden in Deutschland etwas aus dem Blickfeld geraten ist. Zwar hat es hier in jüngster Zeit eine gewisse Entspannung gegeben. Aber diese wird nicht nachhaltig sein, solange – wie bislang – strukturelle Reformen zur Stärkung der kommunalen Ebene ausbleiben. Gerade für die Kommunen in Ostdeutschland ist wegen des Auslaufens des Solidarpaktes II, sinkender Hilfszahlungen der Europäischen Union sowie der abnehmenden Bevölkerung auf längere Sicht mit finanziellen Problemen zu rechnen. Es wäre an der Zeit, neben der immer wieder geforderten Stärkung der kommunalen Kompetenzen bei der Besteuerung auch eine Lichtung des Dickichts an Regulierungen in Angriff zu nehmen, mit denen Bund und Länder die Erledigung kommunaler Aufgaben gegenwärtig zu steuern versuchen.
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