Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
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Messbar, aber milde: Auswirkungen des SMP-Wertpapier-Ankaufprogramms der EZB auf den regionalen Bankenwettbewerb in Deutschland
Friederike Altgelt, Michael Koetter
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2017
Abstract
Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat mit dem Securities Markets Programme (SMP) im Mai 2010 ein Instrument unkonventioneller Geldpolitik eingeführt. Im Rahmen des SMP erwarb sie im Wert von 218 Mrd. Euro Staatsanleihen ausgewählter Länder, welche erhöhten Risikoaufschlägen am Kapitalmarkt ausgesetzt waren. Eine mögliche Nebenwirkung solcher Ankaufprogramme ist es, auch jene Banken zu stützen, die nicht zum direkten Adressatenkreis gehören, aber Anleihen betroffener Länder in ihren Portfolios hielten. Möglicherweise resultierende Refinanzierungs-, Ertrags-, und Liquiditätsvorteile für bevorteilte Banken könnten zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen führen. Dieser Beitrag betrachtet deshalb die Wertpapierportfolios regionaler deutscher Banken, um den kausalen Effekt des SMP auf das Wettbewerbsverhalten zu identifizieren. Die empirischen Befunde belegen in der Tat eine statistisch nachweisbare Zunahme der lokalen Marktanteile jener regionalen Banken, welche Anleihen in ihren Portfolios hielten, die Teil des SMP waren. Während dieses Ergebnis somit einen Beleg für die Existenz unbeabsichtigter Nebenwirkungen unkonventioneller Geldpolitik darstellt, so ist auch festzuhalten dass diese Wettbewerbseffekte ausgesprochen klein sind. Somit ist zumindest für den regionalen Bankenmarkt in Deutschland keine nennenswerte Verwerfung aufgrund dieses Ankaufprogramms festzustellen.
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Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
Michael Koetter, Natalia Podlich, Michael Wedow
ECB Working Paper Series,
Nr. 2017,
2017
Abstract
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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