Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.

Job training is widely regarded as crucial for protecting workers from automation, yet there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this belief. Using internationally harmonized data from over 90,000 workers across 37 industrialized countries, we construct an individual-level measure of automation risk based on tasks performed at work. Our analysis reveals substantial within-occupation variation in automation risk, overlooked by existing occupation-level measures. To assess whether job training mitigates automation risk, we exploit within-occupation and within-industry variation. Additionally, we employ entropy balancing to re-weight workers without job training based on a rich set of background characteristics, including tested numeracy skills as a proxy for unobserved ability. We find that job training reduces workers’ automation risk by 4.7 percentage points, equivalent to 10 percent of the average automation risk. The training-induced reduction in automation risk accounts for one-fifth of the wage returns to job training. Job training is effective in reducing automation risk and increasing wages across nearly all countries, underscoring the external validity of our findings. Women tend to benefit more from training than men, with the advantage becoming particularly pronounced at older ages.

Job training is widely regarded as crucial for protecting workers from automation, yet there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this belief. Using internationally harmonized data from over 90,000 workers across 37 industrialized countries, we construct an individual-level measure of automation risk based on tasks performed at work. Our analysis reveals substantial within-occupation variation in automation risk, overlooked by existing occupation-level measures. To assess whether job training mitigates automation risk, we exploit within-occupation and within-industry variation. Additionally, we employ entropy balancing to re-weight workers without job training based on a rich set of background characteristics, including tested numeracy skills as a proxy for unobserved ability. We find that job training reduces workers’ automation risk by 4.7 percentage points, equivalent to 10 percent of the average automation risk. The training-induced reduction in automation risk accounts for one-fifth of the wage returns to job training. Job training is effective in reducing automation risk and increasing wages across nearly all countries, underscoring the external validity of our findings. Women tend to benefit more from training than men, with the advantage becoming particularly pronounced at older ages.

Establishment closures have lasting negative consequences for the workers displaced from their jobs. We study how these consequences vary with the amount of skill mismatch that workers experience after job displacement. Developing new measures of occupational skill redundancy and skill shortage, we analyze the work histories of individuals in Germany between 1975 and 2010. We estimate difference-in-differences models, using a sample of displaced workers who are matched to statistically similar non-displaced workers. We find that displacements increase the probability of occupation change eleven-fold. Moreover, the magnitude of post-displacement earnings losses strongly depends on the type of skill mismatch that workers experience in such job switches. Whereas skill shortages are associated with relatively quick returns to the earnings trajectories that displaced workers would have experienced absent displacement, skill redundancy sets displaced workers on paths with permanently lower earnings. We show that these differences can be attributed to differences in mismatch after displacement, and not to intrinsic differences between workers making different post-displacement career choices.

We propose a novel mechanism through which established firms contribute to the startup ecosystem: the allocation of R&D tax credits to startups via the M&A channel. We show that when established firms become eligible for R&D tax credits, they increase their R&D and M&A activity. In particular, they acquire more venture capital (VC)-backed startups, but not non-VC-backed firms. Moreover, the impact of R&D tax credits on firms’ R&D is increasing with their acquisition of VC-backed startups. The results suggest that established firms respond to R&D tax credits by acquiring startups rather than solely focusing on increasing their R&D intensity in-house. We also highlight evidence that startups do not appear to benefit from R&D tax credits directly, perhaps because they typically lack the taxable income necessary to directly benefit from the tax credits. In this context, established firms can play an intermediary role by acquiring startups and reallocating R&D tax credits, effectively relaxing the financial constraints faced by startups.

Establishment closures have lasting negative consequences for the workers they displace from their jobs. We study how these consequences vary with the amount of skill mismatch that workers experience after job displacement. Developing new measures of occupational skill redundancy and skill shortage, we analyze the work histories of individuals in Germany between 1975 and 2010. We estimate differencein- differences models, using a sample of displaced workers who are matched to statistically similar non-displaced workers. We find that displacements increase the probability of occupational change eleven-fold. Moreover, the magnitude of postdisplacement earnings losses strongly depends on the type of skill mismatch that workers experience in such job switches. Whereas skill shortages are associated with relatively quick returns to the counterfactual earnings trajectories that displaced workers would have experienced absent displacement, skill redundancy sets displaced workers on paths with permanently lower earnings. We show that these differences can be attributed to differences in mismatch after displacement, and not to intrinsic differences between workers making different post-displacement career choices.