The Appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure for Central and Eastern European Countries
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Martina Kämpfe, Tobias Knedlik
Empirica,
Nr. 1,
2021
Abstract
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It was published first time in 2012 by the European Commission as a reaction to public debt crises in Europe. So far, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure takes a one-size-fits-all approach with regard to the identification of thresholds. The experience of Central and Eastern European Countries during the global financial crisis and in the resulting public debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the appropriateness of scoreboard of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission for this group of catching-up countries. It is shown that while some of the indicators of the scoreboard are helpful to predict crises in the region, thresholds are in most cases set too narrow since it largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies, in particular higher and more volatile growth rates of various macroeconomic variables.
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Betriebsräte und andere Formen der betrieblichen Mitarbeitervertretung – Substitute oder Komplemente?
Stefan Ertelt, Boris Hirsch, Claus Schnabel
Industrielle Beziehungen,
Nr. 3,
2017
Abstract
Der Beitrag untersucht anhand des IAB-Betriebspanels (2004-2013) die Verbreitung, Entwicklung und Interdependenz von Betriebsräten und anderen, meist betriebsinitiierten Formen der Mitarbeitervertretung (wie z.B. Runde Tische). In der Privatwirtschaft sind Betriebsräte gleich häufig zu finden wie andere Mitarbeitervertretungen, doch kommt eine gleichzeitige Existenz beider Gremien in einem Betrieb kaum vor. Ökonometrische Analysen mit rekursiven Probit-Modellen verdeutlichen, dass z.T. unterschiedliche Faktoren das Vorhandensein dieser alternativen Formen der Mitarbeitervertretung erklären und dass bezüglich ihrer Existenz, Gründung und Auflösung Betriebsräte und andere Mitarbeitervertretungen negativ miteinander korrelieren. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass zwischen beiden Formen der Arbeitnehmerpartizipation eine überwiegend substitutive Beziehung besteht.
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Institutional transition, social capital mix and local ties – Does Communist legacy explain low labour mobility?
Peter Bönisch, Lutz Schneider
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge,
Nr. 66,
2010
Abstract
Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, wieso Ostdeutsche trotz schlechter Arbeitsmarktbedingungen eine vergleichsweise geringe räumliche Mobilität aufweisen. Auf Basis des GSOEP wird ein simultanes Drei-Gleichungs-Modell (Geordnetes Probit) geschätzt, welches belegt, dass informelles Sozialkapital die regionale Mobilität verringert, während es formales Sozialkapital unterstützt. Ostdeutsche, welche im Kommunismus aufgewachsen sind, sind stärker im lokal gebundenen informalen Kapital investiert als im formalen Typ. Die geringere Mobilität ist somit zu einem erheblichen Teil dem systemspezifischen Sozialkapital-Mix geschuldet
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A Simple Representation of the Bera-Jarque-Lee Test for Probit Models
Joachim Wilde
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 13,
2007
Abstract
The inference in probit models relies on the assumption of normality. However, tests of this assumption are not implemented in standard econometric software. Therefore, the paper presents a simple representation of the Bera-Jarque-Lee test, that does not require any matrix algebra. Furthermore, the representation is used to compare the Bera-Jarque- Lee test with the RESET-type test proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
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Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction
Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 14,
2006
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
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A note on GMM-estimation of probit models with endogenous regressors
Joachim Wilde
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2005
Abstract
Dagenais (1999) and Lucchetti (2002) have demonstrated that the naive GMM estimator of Grogger (1990) for the probit model with an endogenous regressor is not consistent. This paper completes their discussion by explaining the reason for the inconsistency and presenting a natural solution. Furthermore, the resulting GMM estimator is analyzed in a Monte-Carlo simulation and compared with alternative estimators.
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