Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament
André Diegmann, Laura Pohlan, Andrea Weber
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2024
Abstract
We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset to measure connections between politicians and the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. The economic effects are mediated by better credit ratings while access to subsidies or procurement contracts are documented to be of lower importance.
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Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Committing to Grow: Privatizations and Firm Dynamics in East Germany
Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, André Diegmann, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 17,
2023
Abstract
This paper investigates a unique policy designed to maintain employment during the privatization of East German firms after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The policy required new owners of the firms to commit to employment targets, with penalties for non-compliance. Using a dynamic model, we highlight three channels through which employment targets impact firms: distorted employment decisions, increased productivity, and higher exit rates. Our empirical analysis, using a novel dataset and instrumental variable approach, confirms these findings. We estimate a 22% points higher annual employment growth rate, a 14% points higher annual productivity growth, and a 3.6% points higher probability of exit for firms with binding employment targets. Our calibrated model further demonstrates that without these targets, aggregate employment would have been 15% lower after 10 years. Additionally, an alternative policy of productivity investment subsidies proved costly and less effective in the short term.
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Medienecho Juli 2024 IWH: “Geschäftsklima für Solo-Selbstständige trübt sich leicht ein” in: Zeit Online, 16.07.2024 IWH: “BMWK zur wirtschaftlichen Lage in Deutschland” in:…
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Lecturers
Lecturers at CGDE Institutions Jordan Adamson Assistant Professor at Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Leipzig University. Website Course: Econometrics (winter term…
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Poison Bonds
Shuo Xia, Rex Wang Renjie
SSRN Discussion Paper,
2023
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of "poison bonds", which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% after 2005. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Further analyses suggest that this practice entrenches incumbent managers, coincidentally benefits bondholders, but destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for understanding the agency benefits and costs of debt: (1) more debt does not necessarily discipline the management; and (2) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Department Profiles
Research Profiles of the IWH Departments All doctoral students are allocated to one of the four research departments (Financial Markets – Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets –…
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Lecturers
Lecturers at CGDE Institutions Jordan Adamson Assistant Professor at Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Leipzig University. Website Course: Econometrics (winter term…
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Department Profiles
Research Profiles of the IWH Departments All doctoral students are allocated to one of the four research departments (Financial Markets – Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets –…
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Archiv
Medienecho-Archiv 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 Dezember 2021 IWH: Ausblick auf Wirtschaftsjahr 2022 in Sachsen mit Bezug auf IWH-Prognose zu Ostdeutschland: "Warum Sachsens…
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