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People Doctoral Students PhD Representatives Alumni Supervisors Lecturers Coordinators Doctoral Students Afroza Alam (Supervisor: Reint Gropp ) Julian Andres Diaz Acosta…
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People Job Market Candidates Doctoral Students PhD Representatives Alumni Supervisors Lecturers Coordinators Job Market Candidates Tommaso Bighelli Job market paper: "The…
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A Macroeconomist’s View on EU Governance Reform: Why and How to Establish Policy Coordination?
Hubert Gabrisch
Economic Annals,
Nr. 191,
2011
Abstract
This paper discusses the need for macroeconomic policy coordination in the E(M)U. Coordination of national policies with cross-border effects does not exist at the macroeconomic level, although requested by the EU Treaty. The need for coordination stems from current account imbalances, which origin in market-induced capital flows, destabilizing the real exchange rates between low and high wage countries. The recent attempts of the Commission and the European Council to reform E(M)U governance do not address this problem and thus remain incapable to protect against future instability.
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On the Institutional Safeguarding of Monetary Policy – A Post-Keynesian Perspective
A. Heise, Toralf Pusch
International Journal of Public Policy,
Nr. 1,
2011
Abstract
The paper takes a fresh look at the governance of the most important macroeconomic objectives: price stability and full employment. On the basis of a post-Keynesian market constellations approach, the necessity and institutional requirements of the coordination of macroeconomic policy areas in general and an optimal central bank setting in particular are analysed, and an amelioration of monetary policy of the neo-Keynesian ‘new macroeconomic consensus’ is provided.
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The Emergence of Wage Coordination in the Central Western European Metal Sector and its Relationship to European Economic Policy
Vera Glassner, Toralf Pusch
Abstract
In the European Monetary Union the transnational coordination of collective wage bargaining has acquired increased importance on the trade union agenda. The metal sector has been at the forefront of these developments. This paper addresses the issue of crossborder coordination of wage setting in the metal sector in the central western European region, that is, in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, where coordination practices have become firmly established in comparison to other sectors. When testing the interaction of wage developments in the metal sector of these three countries, relevant macroeconomic (inflation and labour productivity) and sector-related variables (employment, export-dependence) are considered with reference to the wage policy guidelines of the European Commission and the European Metalworkers’ Federation. Empirical evidence can be found for a wage coordination effect in the form of increasing compliance with the wage policy guidelines of the European Metalworkers’ Federation. The evidence for compliance with the stability-oriented wage guideline of the European Commission is weaker.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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