Do Rights Offerings Reduce Bargaining Complexity in Chapter 11

This paper investigates the role of rights offerings in U.S. Chapter 11 reorganizations as a new market-based mechanism for mitigating bargaining frictions.

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Gunjan Seth (University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business)

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IWH, conference room and via Zoom

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Gunjan Seth is an Assistant Professor in Finance and Business Economics at the University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business. Her research interests are primarily in the resolution of financial distress, with current projects focusing on agency conflicts and bargaining frictions in corporate bankruptcies.

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This paper investigates the role of rights offerings in U.S. Chapter 11 reorganizations as a new market-based mechanism for mitigating bargaining frictions. Using hand-collected data, I document three novel facts: (i) in the past decade, rights offerings financed 47% of bankruptcies, (ii) they are typically proposed and underwritten by hedge funds or private equity firms, and (iii) their occurrence is highly correlated with stock market performance. In an instrumental variable setting, I find that compared with other sources of financing, rights offerings lead to higher recovery rates, shorter time spent in Chapter 11, and lower bankruptcy refiling rates. They also allow firms to access new capital without resorting to asset liquidations, which are value-reducing. My findings suggest that by alleviating key bargaining frictions in large and complex bankruptcy cases, rights offerings may improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy.