Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament
André Diegmann, Laura Pohlan, Andrea Weber
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2024
Abstract
We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset to measure connections between politicians and the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. The economic effects are mediated by better credit ratings while access to subsidies or procurement contracts are documented to be of lower importance.
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Flight to Safety: How Economic Downturns Affect Talent Flows to Startups
Shai B. Bernstein, Richard R. Townsend, Ting Xu
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
Using proprietary data from AngelList Talent, we study how startup job seekers’ search and application behavior changed during the COVID-19 downturn. We find that workers shifted their searches and applications away from less-established startups and toward more-established ones, even within the same individual over time. At the firm level, this shift was not offset by an influx of new job seekers. Less-established startups experienced a relative decline in the quantity and quality of applications, ultimately affecting their hiring. Our findings uncover a flight-to-safety channel in the labor market that may amplify the procyclical nature of entrepreneurial activities.
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Climate Change Exposure and the Value Relevance of Earnings and Book Values of Equity
Iftekhar Hasan, Joseph A. Micale, Donna Rapaccioli
Journal of Sustainable Finance and Accounting,
March
2024
Abstract
We investigate whether a firm’s exposure to climate change, as proxied by disclosures during quarterly earnings conference calls, provides forward-looking information to investors regarding the long-term association of stock prices with current earnings and the book values of equity. Following a key regulatory mandate around the formation of the cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions related to climate change, firms’ climate change exposure decreases the association between current earnings and stock prices while increasing the relevance of book values of equity (i.e., historical earnings). However, these relationships flip when the sentiment around climate change exposure is negative, suggesting that the risks related to climate change exposure provide forward-looking information to investors when they evaluate the ability of current earnings to predict firm values. Such a relationship is stronger for new economy firms and is sensitive to conservative accounting. We also observe that the inclusion of climate change disclosure to our models improves the joint ability of earnings and book values to predict stock prices.
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Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Medienecho
Medienecho November 2024 IWH: Manchmal wäre der Schlussstrich die angemessenere Lösung in: TextilWirtschaft, 21.11.2024 IWH: Existenzgefahr Nun droht eine Pleitewelle in: DVZ…
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Archiv
Medienecho-Archiv 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 Dezember 2021 IWH: Ausblick auf Wirtschaftsjahr 2022 in Sachsen mit Bezug auf IWH-Prognose zu Ostdeutschland: "Warum Sachsens…
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W1 Assistant Professor (f/m/d) in Macroeconomics, Productivity Dynamics
Stellenausschreibung W1 Assistant Professor (f/m/d) in Macroeconomics, Productivity Dynamics The Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the Friedrich Schiller…
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Department Profiles
Research Profiles of the IWH Departments All doctoral students are allocated to one of the four research departments (Financial Markets – Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets –…
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Lecturers
Lecturers at CGDE Institutions Jordan Adamson Assistant Professor at Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Leipzig University. Website Course: Econometrics (winter term…
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Poison Bonds
Shuo Xia, Rex Wang Renjie
SSRN Discussion Paper,
2023
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of "poison bonds", which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% after 2005. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Further analyses suggest that this practice entrenches incumbent managers, coincidentally benefits bondholders, but destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for understanding the agency benefits and costs of debt: (1) more debt does not necessarily discipline the management; and (2) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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