This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.

We hypothesize and empirically establish that economic preferences for risk-taking in different subnational regions affect firm financing costs. We study this hypothesis by hand-matching firms' regions worldwide with the corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. We first show that higher regional risk-taking is positively associated with several measures of firm risk and investments. Subsequently, our baseline results show that credit and bond pricing increase when risk-taking preferences increase. For the loan of average size and maturity a one-standard-deviation increase in regional risk-taking increases interest expense by $0.54 million USD. We also find that these results are demand (firm)-driven and stronger for firms with more local shareholders.

The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.