Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting
Geraldo Cerqueiro, Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.
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The Role of Investment Banking for the German Economy: Final Report for Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/Main
Michael Schröder, M. Borell, Reint E. Gropp, Z. Iliewa, L. Jaroszek, G. Lang, S. Schmidt, K. Trela
ZEW-Dokumentationen, Nr. 12-01,
Nr. 1,
2011
Abstract
The aim of this study is to assess the contributions of investment banking to the economy with a particular focus on the German economy. To this end we analyse both the economic benefits and the costs stemming from investment banking.
The study focuses on investment banks as this part of banking is particularly relevant for financing companies as well as the development and use of specific products to support the needs of private and professional clients. The assessment of benefits and costs of investment banking has been conducted from a European perspective. Nevertheless there is a focus on the German economy to allow a more detailed analysis of certain aspects as for example the use of derivatives by German companies, the success of M&As in Germany or the effect of securitization on loan supply and GDP in Germany. For comparison purposes other European countries and also the U.S. have been taken into account.
The last financial crisis has shown the negative impacts of banks on the financial system and the whole economy. In a study on the contribution of investment banks to systemic risk we quantify the negative side of the investment banking business.
In the last part of the study we assess how the effects of regulatory changes on investment banking. All important changes in banking and capital market regulation are taken into account such as Basel III, additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions, regulation of OTC derivatives and specific taxes.
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Bank-specific Shocks and the Real Economy
Claudia M. Buch, Katja Neugebauer
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2011
Abstract
Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding Management
Elena Loutskina
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 3,
2011
Abstract
This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.
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Real Estate Prices and Bank Stability
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 34,
2010
Abstract
Real estate prices can deviate from their fundamental value due to rigid supply, heterogeneity in quality, and various market imperfections, which have two contrasting effects on bank stability. Higher prices increase the value of collateral and net wealth of borrowers and thus reduce the likelihood of credit defaults. In contrast, persistent deviations from fundamentals may foster the adverse selection of increasingly risky creditors by banks seeking to expand their loan portfolios, which increases bank distress probabilities. We test these hypotheses using unique data on real estate markets and banks in Germany. House price deviations contribute to bank instability, but nominal house price developments do not. This finding corroborates the importance of deviations from the fundamental value of real estate, rather than just price levels or changes alone, when assessing bank stability.
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Bank Credit Standards, Demand, Pro-cyclicality and the Business Cycle: A Comment
Á. Maddaloni, J. L. Peydró Alcalde, J. Suárez, Reint E. Gropp
Moneda y crédito,
Nr. 230,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the determinants fo standards and demand for loans to firms and house-holds over the last business cycle using the comprehensive and confidential Bank Lending Survery from the Euro area. There is significant variation of standards and demand over the cycle. Standards for business loans vary more during the business cycle than the lending standards for households, whereas credit demand from households varies more than demand from firms. Lending standards vary mainly due to charges in perception of borrower risk, bank balance sheet positions and competitive pressures. In particular, we find that higher GDP growth softens lending standards for all loans, i. e. lending standards are pro-cyclical. However, we also find pro-cyclicality in credit demand.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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