The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Nikolaos Mylonidis
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 1,
2017
Abstract
To study the presence of a risk-taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk-taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply-side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk-taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk-taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.
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Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison
Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
Applied Economics Letters,
Nr. 7,
2017
Abstract
The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.
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Why They Keep Missing: An Empirical Investigation of Rational Inattention of Rating Agencies
Gregor von Schweinitz, Makram El-Shagi
Abstract
Sovereign ratings have frequently failed to predict crises. However, the literature has focused on explaining rating levels rather than the timing of rating announcements. We fill this gap by explicitly differentiating between a decision to assess a country and the actual rating decision. Thereby, we account for rational inattention of rating agencies that exists due to costs of reassessment. Exploiting information of rating announcements, we show that (i) the proposed differentiation significantly improves estimation; (ii) rating agencies consider many nonfundamental factors in their reassessment decision; (iii) markets only react to ratings providing new information; (iv) developed countries get preferential treatment.
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How Do Insured Deposits Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Claudia Lambert, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2017
Abstract
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
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Complexity and Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Economics Letters,
January
2017
Abstract
We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ complexity and relate it to banks’ riskiness. The sample covers stock listed Euro area banks from 2007 to 2014. Bank stability is significantly affected by complexity, whereas the direction of the effect differs across complexity measures.
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State Aid and Guarantees in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, Lena Tonzer
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, governments massively intervened in the banking sector by providing liquidity assistance and capital support to banks in distress. This helped stabilize the financial system in the short run. However, public bailouts also bear the risk of longer-term distortions, for example, by affecting bailout expectations of banks. In this chapter, the authors first provide an overview of state aid interventions during the recent crisis episode. The third section then analyzes the effects of state aid on financial stability from a theoretical view. This is followed by the description of results obtained from empirical studies. The link between the provision of state aid and politics is discussed in the section “Institutional Design and Policy Implications”. Finally, in the section “The European Banking Union” the authors describe the elements of the European Banking Union meant to resolve and restructure banks in distress and to lower the need for public intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the new design.
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Borrowers Under Water! Rare Disasters, Regional Banks, and Recovery Lending
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth, Oliver Rehbein
Abstract
We show that local banks provide corporate recovery lending to firms affected by ad-verse regional macro shocks. Banks that reside in counties unaffected by the natural disaster that we specify as macro shock increase lending to firms inside affected counties by 3%. Firms domiciled in flooded counties, in turn, increase corporate borrowing by 16% if they are connected to banks in unaffected counties. We find no indication that recovery lending entails excessive risk-taking or rent-seeking. However, within the group of shock-exposed banks, those without access to geographically more diversified interbank markets exhibit more credit risk and less equity capital.
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18.10.2016 • 46/2016
Preisverzerrungen Fehlanzeige – Keine Hinweise für Effekte der Bankenrettung in den USA
Die immensen Rettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 wurden in Politik und Öffentlichkeit kontrovers diskutiert. Die Programme hatten zum Ziel, den Finanzsektor und damit auch die realwirtschaftliche Entwicklung zu stabilisieren. Die Schattenseite: Enorme finanzielle Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat und mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf den Wettbewerb am Bankenmarkt – denn nicht alle Banken wurden finanziell unterstützt. Forscher und Forscherinnen um Felix Noth untersuchten am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) nun die langfristigen indirekten und möglichen marktverzerrenden Effekte der Notrettungsprogramme in den USA.
Felix Noth
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Preisverzerrungen Fehlanzeige – Keine Hinweise für Effekte der Bankenrettung in den USA
Felix Noth, Karolin Vogt
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 4,
2016
Abstract
Im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 rückte die Kontroverse um staatliche Notrettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor verstärkt ins Blickfeld. Diese Programme haben das Ziel, den Finanzsektor und somit auch realwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu stabilisieren. Dem stehen die finanziellen Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat sowie mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur gegenüber. Dieser Artikel diskutiert mögliche Preisverzerrungen durch das Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in den USA aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags, der die langfristigen indirekten Effekte des Programms innerhalb der Gruppe der nicht unterstützten Banken untersucht. Hierbei zeigen sich keine Hinweise dafür, dass das Programm zur Bankenrettung zu nachhaltigen Unterschieden im Bankenwettbewerb nach 2010 geführt hat. Die Zinsmargen von Banken mit einer höheren Rettungswahrscheinlichkeit stiegen nur in der direkten Folgezeit von TARP, d. h. im Jahr 2010 an. Ein signifikanter Anstieg des Kredit- und Depotwachstum der Banken für den Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2013 kann nicht verzeichnet werden.
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29.09.2016 • 40/2016
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose im Herbst 2016: Deutsche Wirtschaft gut ausgelastet – Wirtschaftspolitik neu ausrichten
Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich in einem moderaten Aufschwung, der von einem stabilen Arbeitsmarkt und kräftigen Konsum gestützt wird. Davon gehen die an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose beteiligten Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute aus. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird demnach im nächsten Jahr um 1,4 Prozent und im Jahr 2018 um 1,6 Prozent wachsen. Für das laufende Jahr wird ein Wachstum von 1,9 Prozent erwartet, so die von der Bundesregierung in Auftrag gegebene Gemeinschaftsdiagnose. Im Frühjahr gingen die Institute noch von einem Wachstum von 1,6 Prozent für dieses und 1,5 Prozent für nächstes Jahr aus.
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