Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper,
Nr. 81,
2020
publiziert in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
IZA Discussion Paper,
Nr. 13909,
2020
publiziert in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Measuring the Indirect Effects of Adverse Employer Behaviour on Worker Productivity – A Field Experiment
Matthias Heinz, Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins, Heiner Schumacher, Matthias Sutter
Economic Journal,
Nr. 632,
2020
Abstract
We conduct a field experiment to study how worker productivity is affected if employers act adversely towards their co-workers. Our employees work for two shifts in a call centre. In our main treatment, we lay off some workers before the second shift. Compared to two control treatments, we find that the lay-off reduces the productivity of unaffected workers by 12%. We find suggestive evidence that this result is not driven by altered beliefs about the job or the management’s competence, but caused by the workers’ perception of unfair employer behaviour. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a prediction experiment with professional HR managers. Our results suggest that the price for adverse employer behaviour goes well beyond the potential tit for tat of directly affected workers.
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Labor Market Power and the Distorting Effects of International Trade
Matthias Mertens
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
January
2020
Abstract
This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.
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Does Extended Unemployment Benefit Duration Ameliorate the Negative Employment Effects of Job Loss?
Daniel Fackler, Jens Stegmaier, Eva Weigt
Labour Economics,
2019
Abstract
We study the effect of job displacement due to bankruptcies on earnings and employment prospects of displaced workers and analyse whether extended potential unemployment benefit duration (PBD) ameliorates the negative consequences of job loss. Using German administrative linked employer-employee data, we find that job loss has long-lasting negative effects on earnings and employment. Displaced workers also more often end up in irregular employment relationships (part-time, marginal part-time employment, and temporary agency work) than their non-displaced counterparts. Applying a regression discontinuity approach that exploits a three months PBD extension at the age threshold of 50 we find hardly any effects of longer PBD on labour market outcomes of displaced workers.
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Price-cost Margin and Bargaining Power in the European Union
Ana Cristina Soares
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2019
Abstract
Using firm-level data between 2004 and 2012 for eleven countries of the European Union (EU), we document the size of product and labour market imperfections within narrowly defined sectors including services which are virtually undocumented. Our findings suggest that perfect competition in both product and labour markets is widely rejected. Levels of the price-cost margin and union bargaining power tend to be higher in some service sectors depicting however substantial heterogeneity. Dispersion within sector and across countries tends to be higher in some services sectors assuming a less tradable nature which suggests that the Single Market integration is partial particularly relaxing the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market. We report also figures for the aggregate economy and show that Eastern countries tend to depict lower product and labour market imperfections compared to other countries in the EU. Also, we provide evidence in favour of a very limited adjustment of both product and labour market imperfections following the international and financial crisis.
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Effekte der Einführung des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns: Eine Fallstudie für das Handwerk in Sachsen-Anhalt
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 5,
2018
Abstract
Knapp 8% der Beschäftigten in den Handwerksbetrieben Sachsen-Anhalts verdienten vor der Einführung des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns zu Beginn des Jahres 2015 brutto weniger als 8,50 Euro je Stunde. Allerdings differiert die Betroffenheit stark. In den besonders betroffenen Gewerken war zu befürchten, dass die durch den Mindestlohn induzierte Kostensteigerung zu einem spürbaren Beschäftigungsabbau führt. In diesem Kontext werden drei Fragen untersucht: (1) Wie hoch war die Mindestlohnbetroffenheit im Handwerk in Sachsen-Anhalt? (2) Welche – über die Lohnkostenerhöhung hinausgehenden – Effekte hatte die Mindestlohneinführung in den Handwerksbetrieben? (3) Welche Ausweichreaktionen haben die Handwerksbetriebe unternommen, um die höhere Kostenbelastung zu bewältigen? Die Untersuchungen basieren auf den von den Handwerkskammern Halle und Magdeburg durchgeführten Konjunkturumfragen, die in Kooperation mit dem IWH um zusätzliche Fragen zur Mindestlohneinführung erweitert wurden. Die Ergebnisse der Schätzungen zeigen keine signifikanten Beschäftigungseffekte infolge der Einführung des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns. Vielmehr haben die Handwerksbetriebe vor allem mit Preiserhöhungen reagiert.
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Indirekte Effekte von als unfair wahrgenommenem Arbeitgeberverhalten auf die Produktivität von Beschäftigten
Sabrina Jeworrek
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2018
Abstract
Jede Organisation, die darüber nachdenkt zu restrukturieren, Löhne zu kürzen oder Angestellte zu entlassen, sollte auch über mögliche Reaktionen der persönlich nicht betroffenen Arbeitnehmer nachdenken. Dieser Beitrag präsentiert Ergebnisse eines Feldexperiments. Es offenbart, dass die als unfair wahrgenommene Handlung des Arbeitgebers – in diesem Fall die Entlassung von Arbeitskollegen – die anschließende Produktivität der nicht direkt betroffenen Arbeitskräfte mindert. Als Teil des Experiments antizipierten erfahrene Personalmanager zwar im Durchschnitt erfolgreich die Konsequenzen unfairen Arbeitgeberverhaltens auf nicht betroffene Arbeitnehmer, einzeln lagen sie jedoch oft daneben.
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"The Good News about Bad News": Information about Past Organisational Failure and its Impact on Worker Productivity
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins, Michael Vlassopoulos
Abstract
Failure in organisations is a very common phenomenon. Little is known about whether past failure affects workers’ subsequent performance. We conduct a field experiment in which we follow up a failed mail campaign to attract new volunteers with a phone campaign pursuing the same goal. We recruit temporary workers to carry out the phone campaign and randomly assign them to either receive or not receive information about the previous failure and measure their performance. We find that informed workers perform better – in terms of both numbers dialed (about 14% improvement) and completed interviews (about 20% improvement) – regardless of whether they had previously worked on the failed mail campaign. Evidence from a second experiment with student volunteers asked to support a campaign to reduce food waste suggests that the mechanism behind our finding relates to contextual inference: Informing workers/volunteers that they are pursuing a goal that is hard to attain seems to add meaning to the work involved, leading them to exert more effort.
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