Start-up Competitions as an Instrument of Entrepreneurship Policy: The German Experience
Michael Schwartz, Maximilian Göthner, Claus Michelsen, N. Waldmann
European Planning Studies,
Nr. 10,
2013
Abstract
The number of aspiring entrepreneurs in high-tech industries who successfully complete the transition from a nascent start-up project towards an operational new venture is comparatively low in Germany. Since the mid-1990s, policy-makers have initiated numerous start-up competitions (SUCs or business plan competitions) to facilitate this important step in the venture creation process. SUCs have two key objectives. They are aimed at increasing start-up activity by motivating potential entrepreneurs, while they should also help to increase the likelihood of subsequent entrepreneurial success through providing necessary entrepreneurial skills to prospective entrepreneurs. With our explorative study, we provide the first comprehensive empirical evidence from a cross-sectional survey of existing SUCs in Germany. Overall, 71 SUCs are identified which are analysed regarding their development, regional distribution, and main structural characteristics. Finally, we outline an agenda of future research questions concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of SUCs as an instrument of entrepreneurship policy.
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Banking Market Competition, Opaque Firms, and the Reallocation Component of Aggregate Growth
R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
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Establishment Exits in Germany: The Role of Size and Age
Daniel Fackler, Claus Schnabel, J. Wagner
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 3,
2013
Abstract
Using comprehensive data for West Germany, this paper investigates the determinants of establishment exit. We find that between 1975 and 2006 the average exit rate has risen considerably. In order to test various “liabilities” of establishment survival identified in the literature, we analyzed the impact of establishment size and put a special focus on differences between young and mature establishments. Our empirical analysis shows that the mortality risk falls with establishment size, which confirms the liability of smallness. The probability of exit is substantially higher for young establishments which are not more than 5 years old, thus confirming the liability of newness. There also exists a liability of aging since exit rates first decline over time, reaching a minimum at ages 15–18, and then rise again somewhat. The determinants of exit differ substantially between young and mature establishments, suggesting that young establishments are more vulnerable in a number of ways.
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Default Options and Social Welfare: Opt In versus Opt Out
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE,
Nr. 3,
2013
Abstract
We offer a social-welfare comparison of the two most prominent default options – opt in and opt out – using a two-period model of localized competition. We demonstrate that when consumers stick to the default option, the prevailing default policy shapes firms' ability to collect and use customer information, and affects their pricing strategy and entry decision differently. The free-entry analysis reveals that fewer firms enter under opt out as competition becomes harsher, and that opt out is the socially preferred default option.
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Survival of Spinoffs and Other Startups: First Evidence for the Private Sector in Germany, 1976-2008
Daniel Fackler, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
Using a 50 percent sample of all establishments in the German private sector, we report that spinoffs are larger and initially employ more skilled and more experienced workers than other startups. Controlling for these and other differences, we find that spinoffs are less likely to exit than other startups. We show that in West and East Germany and in all sectors investigated pulled spinoffs (where the parent company continues after they are founded) generally have the lowest exit hazards, followed by pushed spinoffs (where the parent company stops operations). The difference between both types of spinoffs is particularly pronounced in the first three years. Contrary to expectations, intra-industry spinoffs are not found to have lower exit hazards in our sample.
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Kommentar: Umdenken in der Gründungsförderung: Klasse statt Masse und ein langer Atem!
Jutta Günther
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2013
Abstract
Erfolgreiche Gründungen sind ein wichtiger Motor der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung eines Landes oder einer Region. Kurz nach der Wiedervereinigung zeigte sich in den Neuen Ländern eine sehr dynamische Entwicklung der Unternehmensgründungen, die deutlich über dem Niveau Westdeutschlands lag. Dieser Boom ist der „Normalität“ gewichen. Der anfänglich hohe Gründungsbedarf in allen Bereichender Wirtschaft scheint gedeckt, und das Zeitfenster der so genannten günstigen Gelegenheiten ist vorüber.
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A Control Group Study of Incubators’ Impact to Promote Firm Survival
Michael Schwartz
Journal of Technology Transfer,
Nr. 3,
2013
Abstract
It is widely unclear as to whether start-up firms supported by publicly-initiated incubator initiatives have higher survival rates than comparable start-up firms that have not received support by such initiatives. This paper contributes to the underlying discussion by performing a large-scale matched-pairs analysis of the long-term survival of 371 incubator firms (after their graduation) from five German incubators and a control group of 371 comparable non-incubated firms. The analysis covers a 10-year time span. To account for the problem of selection bias, a non-parametric matching approach is applied to identify an appropriate control group. For neither of the five incubator locations, we find statistically significant higher survival probabilities for firms located in incubators compared to firms located outside those incubator organizations. For three incubator locations the analysis reveals statistically significant lower chances of survival for those start-ups receiving support by an incubator. The empirical results, therefore, raise some doubts regarding the impacts of incubation on long-term firm survival.
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Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Theon van Dijk
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2013
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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Payment Defaults and Interfirm Liquidity Provision
F. Boissay, Reint E. Gropp
Review of Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
Nr. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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