Macroprudential Policy and Intra-group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil
Chris Becker, Matias Ossandon Busch, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper examines whether intra-group dynamics matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using novel bank-level data on the Brazilian banking system, we investigate the effect of reserve requirements targeting headquarter banks’ deposit share on credit supply by their municipal bank branches. For identification purposes, we exploit that reserve requirements are adjusted following global economic cycles. Our results reveal a lending channel of reserve requirements for branches whose parent banks are more exposed to targeted deposits. Branch ownership and exposure to internal liquidity are central in explaining the results. Our findings reveal limitations in current macroprudential policy frameworks.
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Nationale Aufsicht versus Europäische Bankenunion: Unterscheidet sich die Beurteilung der Einflussfaktoren systemischen Risikos von Banken?
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 3,
2017
Abstract
Als Reaktion auf die Finanzkrise unterliegt das Finanzsystem zahlreichen neuen regulatorischen Änderungen. Zum einen wurden bestehende mikroprudenzielle Regeln für Eigenkapital und Liquidität verschärft. Zum anderen wurden makroprudenzielle Instrumente eingeführt. Makroprudenzielle Regulierung hat dabei zum Ziel, systemische Risiken im Finanzsystem frühzeitig zu erkennen, zu reduzieren und somit die Finanzmarktstabilität zu erhöhen. Zudem wurde mit der Einführung der Bankenunion die Aufsicht der größten Banken des Euroraums der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) übertragen. Diese Studie untersucht, ob das systemische Risiko von Banken unterschiedlich groß ist, wenn eine europäische im Vergleich zu einer nationalen Perspektive eingenommen wird. Im Anschluss wird die Frage geklärt, welche Faktoren systemisches Risiko beeinflussen und ob sich diese Faktoren zwischen der nationalen und europäischen Ebene unterscheiden. Es zeigt sich, dass Banken auf nationaler Ebene im Durchschnitt etwas mehr zum systemischen Risiko beitragen, wobei es große Unterschiede zwischen Banken und Ländern gibt. Zudem haben größere und profitablere Banken sowie Banken, deren Geschäftsmodell durch eine geringere Kreditvergabe geprägt ist, ein höheres systemisches Risiko.
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Transposition Frictions, Banking Union, and Integrated Financial Markets in Europe
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
G20 Insights Policy Brief, Policy Area "Financial Resilience",
2017
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008, policymakers implemented comprehensive changes concerning the regulation and supervision of banks. Many of those changes, including Basel III or the directives pertaining to the Single Rulebook in the European Union (EU), are agreed upon at the supranational level, which constitutes a key step towards harmonized regulation and supervision in an integrated European financial market. However, the success of these reforms depends on the uniform and timely implementation at the national level. Avoiding strategic delays to implement EU regulation into national laws should thus constitute a main target of the G20.
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Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements and Firm Innovation: Does State Regulation Matter?
Desheng Yin, Iftekhar Hasan, Nada Kobeissi, Haizhi Wang
Innovation: Organization & Management,
Nr. 2,
2017
Abstract
In this study, we examine how noncompetition agreements and the mobility of human capital – a core asset of any firm – affect innovations of publicly traded firms in the United States. We find that firms in states with stricter noncompetition enforcement have fewer patent applications. We also examine patent forward citations and find that tougher enforcement of such contracts is associated with less innovative patents. Notably, we find that stronger enforcement of noncompetition agreements impedes innovation for firms facing intense industry labor mobility. High-powered, equity-based compensation positively moderates the relationship between noncompetition enforcement and innovation, but only for the quality of innovation.
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How Do Insured Deposits Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Claudia Lambert, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2017
Abstract
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
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Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Carlo Wix
Abstract
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and its transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise provides an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment, which allows us to identify the effect of higher capital requirements using a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. We also show that this reduction in credit supply results in lower firm-, investment-, and sales growth for firms which obtain a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
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Mortgage Companies and Regulatory Arbitrage
Yuliya Demyanyk, Elena Loutskina
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2016
Abstract
Mortgage companies (MCs) do not fall under the strict regulatory regime of depository institutions. We empirically show that this gap resulted in regulatory arbitrage and allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to circumvent consumer compliance regulations, mitigate capital requirements, and reduce exposure to loan-related losses. Compared to bank subsidiaries, MC subsidiaries of BHCs originated riskier mortgages to borrowers with lower credit scores, lower incomes, higher loan-to-income ratios, and higher default rates. Our results imply that precrisis regulations had the capacity to mitigate the deterioration of lending standards if consistently applied and enforced for all types of intermediaries.
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International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany
Jana Ohls, Markus Pramor, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments, these spillovers are however quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, foreign banks located in Germany reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements and loan to value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements was effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.
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27.06.2016 • 27/2016
Wie können wir den Wettbewerb im Dienstleistungssektor ankurbeln?
Konferenz des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) und der Vertretung der EU-Kommission in Deutschland
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24.06.2016 • 26/2016
Großbritanniens Nein zur EU wird für beide Seiten teuer
Die Briten haben sich heute gegen einen Verbleib ihres Landes in der Europäischen Union entschieden. Sie stimmten heute überraschend klar dafür, den EU-Verbund zu verlassen. Das Ausscheiden Großbritanniens aus der EU hat nicht nur politisch, sondern auch ökonomisch tiefgreifende Konsequenzen für das Land selbst, aber auch für das übrige Europa. „Entscheidend ist jetzt die Reaktion der verbleibenden Länder auf das Votum, insbesondere die Frankreichs und Deutschlands“, sagt Reint E. Gropp, Präsident des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Reint E. Gropp
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