VC Participation and Failure of Startups: Evidence from P2P Lending Platforms in China
Iftekhar Hasan, Xiaoyang Li
Finance Research Letters,
May
2021
Abstract
We investigate how VC participation affects the failure of startups. Using a unique dataset of the survival of peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms in China, we identify two types of failures, bankruptcy, and run off with investors' money. The Competing Risk Model results show that while VC participation reduces bankruptcy hazard, it has little impact on the runoff failures. The findings are robust to the use of matched subsamples that disentangle the influence of pre-investment screening by VC. Further analysis of exit routes reveals that conditional on failure, VC participation is associated with a higher chance of running for the exit.
Artikel Lesen
Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
Artikel Lesen
Market Power and Risk: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Market
Carola Müller, Felix Noth
Economics Letters,
2018
Abstract
We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.
Artikel Lesen
Should Banks Diversify or Focus? Know Thyself: The Role of Abilities
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, A. Melih Küllü, Mingming Zhou
Economic Systems,
Nr. 1,
2018
Abstract
The paper investigates whether diversification/focus across assets, industries and borrowers affects bank performance when banks’ abilities (screening and monitoring) are considered. The initial results show that diversification (focus) at the asset, industry and borrower levels is expected to decrease (increase) returns. However, once banks’ screening and monitoring abilities are controlled for, the effect of diversification/focus either gets weaker or disappears. Further, in some cases, these abilities enhance banks’ long-run performance, but in others they prove to be costly, at least, in the short run. Thus, the level of monitoring and screening abilities should be taken into consideration in understanding, planning and implementing diversification/focus strategies.
Artikel Lesen
Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort Under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
Artikel Lesen
Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 5,
2011
Abstract
Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.
Artikel Lesen
Im Fokus: Zeitarbeit im ostdeutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbe
Dirk Trocka, Marco Sunder
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 8,
2008
Abstract
Neben „klassischen“ Beschäftigungsverhältnissen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern gewinnen mit Zeitarbeit auch Dreiecksbeziehungen zunehmende Bedeutung am Arbeitsmarkt. Ein Personal-Leasing-Unternehmen
fungiert hier als Intermediär am Arbeitsmarkt und vermietet gewerbsmäßig seine Beschäftigten an andere Unternehmen. Als „Kollegen auf Zeit“ sind sie dann an die Weisungen des entleihenden Unternehmens gebunden und erbringen dort ihre Arbeitsleistung. Zwar umfasste diese Form der Arbeitsorganisation Mitte 2007 sowohl in Ost- als auch in Westdeutschland jeweils erst rund 2% der Erwerbstätigen (bzw. 140.000 Personen in Ostdeutschland einschließlich Berlin), jedoch waren die Zuwachsraten beachtlich: Unter den eine Million zusätzlichen Beschäftigungsverhältnissen, die zwischen 2003 und 2007 in Deutschland entstanden sind, entfielen allein 40% auf das Konto von Zeitarbeit. Unternehmen mit Personalbedarf eröffnet sie die Möglichkeit, ohne aufwendiges Screening von Bewerbern kurzfristige Spitzen in den Auftragseingängen abzuarbeiten, gerade in einem stark regulierten Arbeitsmarkt.
Artikel Lesen
Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
Nr. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
Artikel Lesen
