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Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz

Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/23

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Finanzintermediäre und die Realwirtschaft

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 4/21

Senior Research Advisor der Abteilungen Finanzmärkte und Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 4/21

Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

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Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Finanzintermediation
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Geldpolitik

Daniel Streitz ist seit April 2021 Senior Research Advisor am IWH und Professor an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Zu den Schwerpunkten seiner Forschung gehören die Finanzintermediation und die Unternehmensfinanzierung.

Daniel Streitz studierte an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster und promovierte an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Bevor er zum IWH kam, war er Assistenzprofessor an der Copenhagen Business School.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
- Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-735 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

Zitationen
733

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Corporate Loan Spreads and Economic Activity

Anthony Saunders Alessandro Spina Sascha Steffen Daniel Streitz

in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 2, 2025

Abstract

<p>We investigate the predictive power of loan spreads for forecasting business cycles, specifically focusing on more constrained, intermediary-reliant firms. We introduce a novel loan-market-based credit spread constructed using secondary corporate loan-market prices over the 1999 to 2023 period. Loan spreads significantly enhance the prediction of macroeconomic outcomes, outperforming other credit-spread indicators. We also explore the underlying mechanisms and differentiate between borrower fundamentals and financial frictions. Evidence suggests that supply-side frictions are a decisive factor in the forecasting ability of loan spreads.</p>

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Credit Supply Shocks: Financing Real Growth or Takeovers?

Tobias Berg Daniel Streitz Michael Wedow

in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Nr. 2, 2024

Abstract

<p>How do firms invest when financial constraints are relaxed? We document that firms affected by a large positive credit supply shock predominantly increase borrowing for transaction-based purposes. These treated firms have larger asset and employment growth rates; however, growth entirely stems from the increased takeover activity. Announcement returns indicate a low quality of the credit-supply-induced takeover activity. These results offer the possibility that credit-driven growth can simply reflect redistribution, rather than net gains in assets or employment.</p>

Publikation lesen
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Financial Debt Contracting and Managerial Agency Problems

Björn Imbierowicz Daniel Streitz

in: Financial Management, Nr. 1, 2024

Abstract

This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Too Poor to Be Green? The Effects of Wealth on the Residential Heating Transformation

Tobias Berg Ulf Nielsson Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Working Paper, 2024

Abstract

<p>Using the near-universe of Danish owner-occupied residential houses, we show that an exogenous increase in wealth significantly increases the likelihood to switch to green heating. We estimate an elasticity of one at the median of the wealth distribution, i.e., a 10% increase in wealth increase raises green heating adoption by 10%. Effects are heterogeneous along the wealth distribution: all else equal, a redistribution of wealth from rich households to poor households can significantly increase green heating adoption. We further explore potential channels of our findings (pro-social preferences, financial constraints, and luxury goods interpretation). Our results emphasize the role of economic growth for the green transition.</p>

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Out of Sight, out of Mind: Divestments and the Global Reallocation of Pollutive Assets

Tobias Berg Lin Ma Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2023

Abstract

<p>Large emitters reduced their carbon emissions by around 11-15% after the 2015 Paris Agreement (“the Agreement”) relative to public firms that are less in the limelight. We show that this effect is predominantly driven by divestments. Large emitters are 9 p.p. more likely to divest pollutive assets in the post-Agreement period, an increase of over 75%. This divestment effect comes from asset sales and not from closures of pollutive facilities. There is no evidence for increased engagements in other emission reduction activities. Our results indicate significant global asset reallocation effects after the Agreement, shifting emissions out of the limelight.</p>

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Capital Misallocation and Innovation

Christian Schmidt Yannik Schneider Sascha Steffen Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Solutions Research Paper Series, 2020

Abstract

This paper documents that &quot;zombie&quot; lending by undercapitalized banks distorts competition and impedes corporate innovation. This misallocation of capital prevents both the exit of zombie and entry of healthy firms in affected industries adversely impacting output and competition. Worse, capital misallocation depresses patent applications, particularly in high technology- and R&amp;D-intensive sectors, and industries with neck- and-neck competition. We strengthen our results using an IV approach to address reverse causality and innovation survey data from the European Commission. Overall, our results are consistent with externalities imposed on healthy firms through the misallocation of capital.

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Themen

Regulierung Finanzinstitutionen Unternehmensfinanzierung Evaluierung von Politikmaßnahmen Finanzmärkte Ökonometrie
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