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Dr. Peter Haug

Dr. Peter Haug
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/02

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Datenschutzbeauftragter
  • Kommunalfinanzen
  • Effizienz der kommunalen Leistungserstellung
  • Kommunalwirtschaft

Peter Haug ist seit 2002 am Institut tätig. Er ist seit 2017 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität. Des Weiteren ist er Mitglied von CompNet. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte umfassen empirische Analysen zu den Bereichen Kommunalfinanzen, Kommunalwirtschaft, kommunale Infrastruktur und demographischer Wandel sowie zur Effizienz der kommunalen Leistungserstellung.

Peter Haug studierte an der Universität Passau und promovierte an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität in Hamburg.

Ihr Kontakt

Dr. Peter Haug
Dr. Peter Haug
- Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-709

Publikationen

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Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency

Ivo Bischoff Peter Bönisch Peter Haug Annette Illy

in: Public Finance Review, Nr. 3, 2019

Abstract

The existing empirical literature on the impact of vertical grants on local public-sector efficiency yields mixed results. Given the fact that vertical financial equalization systems often reduce differences in fiscal capacity, we argue that empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency of public service production even when the underlying causal effect is not. We provide a simple illustrative theoretical model to show the logic of our argument and illustrate its relevance by an empirical case study for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. We show that our main argument of an inference-disturbing effect applies to those existing studies that are more optimistic about the impact of vertical grants. Finally, we argue that it may disturb the inference drawn from studies in a number of other countries where vertical grants—intended or not—concentrate in fiscally weak municipalities.

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The Efficiency of Local Public-service Production: The Effect of Political Institutions

Peter Bönisch Peter Haug

in: FinanzArchiv, Nr. 2, 2018

Abstract

Reforms replacing municipal cooperations by centralized municipalities often aim at increasing municipal efficiency. Empirical evidence supporting this aim, however, is ambiguous. Our paper analyzes the effect of institutions on municipal efficiency. In particular, we distinguish two archetypal institutional settings, a centralized and a confederal one, and argue that bureaucrats in a centralized setting are able to increase the fiscal residual. Our empirical test case is the German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. We test the effect of the institutional setup using the bootstrap approach suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007), concluding that a decentralized institutional setting improves the efficiency of municipal production.

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Does Intermunicipal Cooperation Increase Efficiency? A Conditional Metafrontier Approach for the Hessian Wastewater Sector

F. Blaeschke Peter Haug

in: Local Government Studies, Nr. 1, 2018

Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship between intermunicipal cooperation and efficiency of public service provision. Organisational arrangements of public service production, including self-provision, joint provision or contracting, affect incentives and internal transaction costs. Hence, cooperation gains from scale effects need to be balanced against technical inefficiencies. We analyse relative efficiency of wastewater disposal for German municipalities. We employ a conditional analysis in conjunction with a metafrontier approach to calculate relative efficiency measures and technology gap ratios controlling for organisational arrangements and further environmental variables. Jointly providing municipalities and contractor municipalities exhibit lower technical efficiency than self-providing and contracting municipalities. As confirmed by previous research, scale effects from cooperation and contracting apply to small municipalities primarily.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Grant Dependence, Regulation and the Effects of Formula-based Grant Systems on German Local Governments: A Data Report for Saxony-Anhalt

Peter Haug

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 2, 2013

Abstract

Recent empirical studies have found – seemingly − efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical grants on local public service provision. The main purpose of this paper is to prepare an elaborate theoretical and empirical analysis of these contradictory results. Therefore, it investigates if certain fiscal and institutional conditions (fiscal stress, fiscal rank-preserving vertical grant systems, input- and output regulation), that might help to explain these empirical findings, are characteristic of at least some parts of the local government sector or certain regions. The German state of Saxony-Anhalt is chosen for case study purposes. The main results are: First, the local governments suffer from severe fiscal problems such as high grant dependency, low tax revenues and the prevalent inability to finance investments by own resources. Second, the output- and input-regulation density of certain mandatory municipal services (schools, childcare facilities, fire protection) is high. Finally, the most important vertical grant category for local governments, the formula-based grants (“Schlüsselzuweisungen”), can be described as mainly exogenous, unconditional block grants that in most cases preserve the relative fiscal position of the grant recipients.

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Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and Municipal Spending: The Case of Germany

Peter Haug

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 9, 2009

Abstract

The paper investigates the existence of fiscal illusion in German municipalities with special focus on the revenues from local public enterprises. These shadow budgets tend to increase the misperception of municipal tax prices and seem to have been neglected in the literature. Therefore, an aggregated expenditure function has been estimated for all German independent cities applying an “integrated budget” approach, which means that revenues and expenditures of the core budget and the local public enterprises are combined to one single municipal budget. The estimation results suggest that a higher relative share of local public enterprise revenues might increase total per capita spending as well as spending for non-obligatory municipal goods and services. Empirical evidence for other sources of fiscal illusion is mixed but some indications for debt illusion, renter illusion or the flypaper effect could be found.

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Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany

Peter Haug

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 3, 2007

Abstract

The paper deals with the effects of local governments’ interference with business affairs of publicly owned utilities. A partial model is presented to illustrate the consequences of “democratic control” for the public managers’ effort and the efficiency of local public production. To check the theoretical results empirically, a two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) is carried out for a sample of East German water suppliers. The organisational form is used as a measure for the degree of municipal control. The results of the OLS- and Tobit regression indicate an efficiency-enhancing effect of organisational forms with less distinctive control options for local politicians.

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