Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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Three methods of forecasting currency crises: Which made the run in signaling the South African currency crisis of June 2006?
Tobias Knedlik, Rolf Scheufele
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 17,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast the South African currency crisis of June 2006. In particular we are interested in the out-ofsample performance of these methods. Thus, we choose the latest crisis to conduct an out-of-sample experiment. In sum, the signals approach was not able to forecast the outof- sample crisis of correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but just with models, that were based on raw data. Employing a Markov-regime-switching approach also allows to predict the out-of-sample crisis. The answer to the question of which method made the run in forecasting the June 2006 currency crisis is: the Markovswitching approach, since it called most of the pre-crisis periods correctly. However, the “victory” is not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models perform remarkably well and it is also able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before their occurrence. It can, therefore, not be recommended to focus on one approach only when evaluating the risk for currency crises.
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Währungspolitische Lehren aus dem Scheitern des argentinischen Currency board
Diemo Dietrich, Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 15,
2002
Abstract
Die Frage nach der richtigen geldpolitischen Strategie für Länder mit einer nur wenig gefestigten Währung ist nach wie vor offen. Der Wandel der wirtschaftspolitischen Empfehlungen wird wesentlich von Erkenntnissen aus neuen Fallbeispielen wirtschaftspolitischer Experimente bestimmt. Die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise von Argentinien bietet eine solche Chance zu lernen. Der Krisenausbruch war mit dem Scheitern des dortigen Currency board verknüpft, einer geldpolitischen Strategie, die in Osteuropa gegenwärtig von Bulgarien, Estland und Litauen verfolgt wird. Der Artikel analysiert anhand des Lehrstücks Argentinien die potenziellen Probleme dieser währungspolitischen Strategie und kommt zu Schlussfolgerungen, die auch für die genannten Länder Osteuropas von Bedeutung sind....
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Das Experiment der „Sozialstationen“ – Zur Effizienz eines parafiskalischen Arrangements im Bereich der Ambulanten Pflege
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Politik der Parafiski,
1996
Abstract
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