Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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The Emergence of Wage Coordination in the Central Western European Metal Sector and its Relationship to European Economic Policy
Vera Glassner, Toralf Pusch
Abstract
In the European Monetary Union the transnational coordination of collective wage bargaining has acquired increased importance on the trade union agenda. The metal sector has been at the forefront of these developments. This paper addresses the issue of crossborder coordination of wage setting in the metal sector in the central western European region, that is, in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, where coordination practices have become firmly established in comparison to other sectors. When testing the interaction of wage developments in the metal sector of these three countries, relevant macroeconomic (inflation and labour productivity) and sector-related variables (employment, export-dependence) are considered with reference to the wage policy guidelines of the European Commission and the European Metalworkers’ Federation. Empirical evidence can be found for a wage coordination effect in the form of increasing compliance with the wage policy guidelines of the European Metalworkers’ Federation. The evidence for compliance with the stability-oriented wage guideline of the European Commission is weaker.
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Measurement Matters — Alternative Input Price Proxies for Bank Efficiency Analyses
Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Services Research,
Nr. 2,
2006
Abstract
Most bank efficiency studies that use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) employ each bank’s own implicit input price when estimating efficient frontiers. But at the same time, most studies are based on cost and/or profit models that assume perfect input markets. Traditional input price proxies therefore contain at least substantial measurement error. We suggest here two alternative input market definitions to approximate exogenous input prices. We have access to Bundesbank data, which allows us to cover virtually all German universal banks between 1993 and 2003. The use of alternative input price proxies leads to mean cost efficiency that is significantly five percentage points lower compared to traditional input prices. Mean profit efficiency is hardly affected. Across models, small cooperative banks located in large western states perform best while large banks and those located in eastern states rank lowest.
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Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
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Liberalization of Electricity Markets in Selected European Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Keim, P. J. J. Welfens
Diskussionsbeiträge des Europäischen Instituts für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW), Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Nr. 124,
Nr. 124,
2004
Abstract
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Fragen der Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte in der EU. Man kann feststellen, dass die Gemeinschaftsdirektive 96/92/EC die Wechselbeziehungen der Elektrizitätsmärkte nicht ausreichend behandelt. Außerdem wird vor allem in Deutschland der Zugang für Dritte nicht effektiv gefördert, wobei der Zusammenschluss eines großen Elektrizitätsunternehmens und einem dominanten Gasunternehmen neue spezielle Fragen aufgeworfen hat. Hingegen verläuft der Liberalisierungsprozess in Skandinavien konsequenter. Osteuropäische EU-Beitrittsländer sind langfristig potenzielle Elektrizitätsexporteure sobald Modernisierungen zu niedrigeren Energie- und Elektrizitätsverbrauch führen. Russland sollte rasch WTO-Mitglied werden, um Zugang zu den westeuropäischen Elektrizitätsmärkten zu bekommen, wobei Russland in den gesamten Liberalisierungsdiskussionen noch keine Rolle gespielt hat. Mittelfristig können Überschusskapazitäten in einer EU-27 erwartet werden. Zweifelhaft jedoch ist, ob Politiker, die ansonsten so ehrgeizige Ambitionen in der Umweltpolitik zeigen, einer gesamteuropäischen Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte zustimmen werden. Außerdem werden regulierungspolitische Aspekte behandelt.
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