Social Capital and Migration Preferences - An Empirical Analysis for the Case of the Reunified Germany
Peter Bönisch, Lutz Schneider, Walter Hyll
Grincoh Working Papers July 2013,
2013
Abstract
We focus on the relevance of different types of social capital on migration intentions in the context of shrinking regions. On the one hand, formal social capital characterised by weak ties without local roots is supposed to drive selectivity and outmigration. On the other hand, informal social capital stressing strong ties to friends, relatives or neighbours might hinder migration. In our regression results we do not find an effect of shrinking regions on mobility intentions. Thus, living in a shrinking area is by itself not a reason to move away or to invest less in social capital. However, if an individual considers to move away she reduces her participation in informal and formal networks. Individuals characterised by strong informal ties, i.e. strong relationships to friends, relatives or neighbours show a significantly lower probability of moving away. And, more qualified types of social capital as participation in local politics or initiatives seem to encourage spatial mobility.
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An Options-based Approach to Forecast Competing Bids: Evidence for Canadian Takeover Battles
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Applied Economics,
Nr. 34,
2013
Abstract
During takeover battles, a tender offer provides a call option right to the target’s shareholders: it guarantees the offered price but maintains the chance of a higher offer. We present an options-based approach to estimate the probability and expected value of higher competing takeover bids using target stock price data. Analysing Canadian takeover battles in the period 1997 to 2007 we find that during the 5 trading days prior to the occurrence of an increased takeover bid, the estimated probability of a higher bid exceeds 80% on average and the expected value of a potential competing bid almost matches the realized value.
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The Term Structure of Sovereign Default Risk in EMU Member Countries and Its Determinants
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.
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Does It Pay to Have Friends? Social Ties and Executive Appointments in Banking
Allen N. Berger, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Klaus Schaeck
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
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Who Invests in Home Equity to Exempt Wealth from Bankruptcy?
S. Corradin, Reint E. Gropp, H. Huizinga, Luc Laeven
Abstract
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy.
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Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie, Shaker Verlag GmbH, Aachen,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
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Predicting Financial Crises: The (Statistical) Significance of the Signals Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Tobias Knedlik, Gregor von Schweinitz
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 35,
2013
Abstract
The signals approach as an early-warning system has been fairly successful in detecting crises, but it has so far failed to gain popularity in the scientific community because it cannot distinguish between randomly achieved in-sample fit and true predictive power. To overcome this obstacle, we test the null hypothesis of no correlation between indicators and crisis probability in three applications of the signals approach to different crisis types. To that end, we propose bootstraps specifically tailored to the characteristics of the respective datasets. We find (1) that previous applications of the signals approach yield economically meaningful results; (2) that composite indicators aggregating information contained in individual indicators add value to the signals approach; and (3) that indicators which are found to be significant in-sample usually perform similarly well out-of-sample.
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Payment Defaults and Interfirm Liquidity Provision
F. Boissay, Reint E. Gropp
Review of Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains.
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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