Do Women Benefit from Competitive Markets? Product Market Competition and the Gender Pay Gap in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Michael Oberfichtner, Claus Schnabel
Economics Bulletin,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
Using a large linked employer–employee dataset for Germany with a direct plant-level measure of product market competition and controlling for job-cell fixed effects, we investigate whether relative wages of women benefit from strong competition. We find that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 2.4 log points lower in West German plants that face strong product market competition than in those experiencing weak competition, whereas no such link shows up for East Germany.
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Monopsonistic Labour Markets and the Gender Pay Gap: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Boris Hirsch
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
Nr. 639,
2010
Abstract
This book investigates models of spatial and dynamic monopsony and their application to the persistent empirical regularity of the gender pay gap. Theoretically, the main conclusion is that employers possess more monopsony power over their female employees if women are less driven by pecuniary considerations in their choice of employers than men. Employers may exploit this to increase their profits at the detriment of women’s wages. Empirically, it is indeed found that women’s labour supply to the firm is less wage-elastic than men’s and that at least a third of the gender pay gap in the data investigated may result from employers engaging in monopsonistic discrimination. Therefore, a monopsonistic approach to gender discrimination in the labour market clearly contributes to the economic understanding of the gender pay gap. It not only provides an intuitively appealing explanation of the gap from standard economic reasoning, but it is also corroborated by empirical observation.
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The Gender Pay Gap under Duopsony: Joan Robinson meets Harold Hotelling
Boris Hirsch
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 5,
2009
Abstract
This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style duopsony model of the labour market. Since there are only two employers, equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that some women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women on average are less inclined to commute and offer lower wages to all women. Since women's firm-level labour supply is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model is in line with Robinson's explanation of wage discrimination.
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The Impact of Female Managers on the Gender Pay Gap: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data for Germany
Boris Hirsch
Economics Letters,
Nr. 3,
2013
Abstract
We find that increasing the female share in first-level management by 10% points decreases the unexplained within-job gender pay gap by 0.5 log points. The effect is more pronounced for the female share in second-level than in first-level management.
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Der Einfluss von Hausarbeit auf die Löhne in Deutschland
Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Konietzko
Journal for Labour Market Research,
Nr. 2,
2013
Abstract
Auf Grundlage zweier deutscher Datensätze, des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels und der Zeitbudgeterhebung, untersucht dieser Beitrag den Einfluss der für Hausarbeit aufgewandten Zeit auf die Löhne. Im Gegensatz zum Gros der internationalen Forschungsliteratur findet sich kein negativer Effekt der Hausarbeit auf die Löhne. Dieses Ergebnis zeigt sich in West- wie Ostdeutschland sowohl für Frauen und Männer, für verheiratete Individuen und Singles als auch für Teilzeit- und Vollzeitbeschäftigte. Unsere Ergebnisse ändern sich zudem nicht, wenn wir verschiedene Formen von Hausarbeit unterscheiden oder die Endogenität der geleisteten Hausarbeit in den Lohnregressionen mithilfe von Instrumentvariablenschätzungen berücksichtigen.
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Is There a Gap in the Gap? Regional Differences in the Gender Pay Gap
Boris Hirsch, Marion König, Joachim Möller
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 4,
2013
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate regional differences in the gender pay gap both theoretically and empirically. Within a spatial model of monopsonistic competition, we show that more densely populated labour markets are more competitive and constrain employers’ ability to discriminate against women. Utilizing a large administrative data set for western Germany and a flexible semi-parametric propensity score matching approach, we find that the unexplained gender pay gap for young workers is substantially lower in large metropolitan than in rural areas. This regional gap in the gap of roughly 10 percentage points remained surprisingly constant over the entire observation period of 30 years.
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Firm Leadership and the Gender Pay Gap: Do Active Owners Discriminate more than Hired Managers?
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
Journal for Labour Market Research,
Nr. 1,
2014
Abstract
Auf Grundlage eines großen kombinierten Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Datensatzes für Deutschland untersuchen wir Unterschiede im unerklärten geschlechtsspezifischen Lohndifferential zwischen eigentümer- und managementgeführten Unternehmen. Wir stellen die Hypothese auf, dass sich aktiven Eigentümern und angestellten Managern unterschiedliche Spielräume zur Auslebung ihrer gewinnsenkenden diskriminatorischen Präferenzen eröffnen und sich daher die Lohndifferentiale zwischen eigentümer- und managementgeführten Unternehmen unterscheiden sollten. Empirisch finden wir statistisch wie ökonomisch signifikant höhere Lohndifferentiale in eigentümergeführten Unternehmen. Die Beschränkung der Stichproben auf hinreichend ähnliche eigentümer- und managementgeführte Unternehmen lässt diese markanten Unterschiede in den Lohndifferentialen jedoch verschwinden. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten daher nicht darauf hin, dass aktive Eigentümer per se mehr diskriminieren.
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Do Government Owned Banks Trade Market Power for Slack?
Andreas Hackethal, Michael Koetter, Oliver Vins
Applied Economics,
Nr. 33,
2012
Abstract
The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
Nr. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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Is There Monopsonistic Discrimination against Immigrants?
Boris Hirsch, Elke J. Jahn
ILR Review,
Nr. 3,
2015
Abstract
The authors investigate immigrants’ and natives’ labor supply to the firm within an estimation approach based on a dynamic monopsony framework. Applying duration models that account for unobserved worker heterogeneity to a large administrative employer–employee data set for Germany, they find that immigrants supply labor less elastically to firms than do natives. Under monopsonistic wage setting, the estimated elasticity differential predicts a 7.7 log points wage penalty for immigrants thereby accounting for the entire unexplained native–immigrant wage differential of 5.8 to 8.2 log points. When further distinguishing immigrant groups differing in their time spent in the German labor market, their immigration cohort, and their age at entry, the authors find that the observed unexplained wage differential is larger for those groups that show a larger elasticity differential relative to natives. These findings not only suggest that search frictions are a likely cause of employers’ more pronounced monopsony power over their immigrant workers but also imply that employers profit from discriminating against immigrants.
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