Veblen's Predator and the Great Crisis
John B. Hall, Iciar Dominguez Lacasa, Jutta Günther
Journal of Economic Issues,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
With this inquiry we attribute cause for the current and “Great Crisis“ to Veblen's predator. After summarizing origins and manifestations of this crisis we juxtapose Veblen's emphasis upon the predator to other potential causes for crisis and crises. Noted to have emerged when our stock of human knowledge provided for the creation of surplus, Veblen's predator is presented as capable of metamorphosis and also driving evolution of our capitalistic system: whether this means emerging as the businessman in the “era of the machine,“ or the investment banker promoting a financial metaphysics in the current “era of finance.“
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Fiscal Spending Multiplier Calculations Based on Input-Output Tables? An Application to EU Member States
Toralf Pusch
Intervention. European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies,
Nr. 1,
2012
Abstract
Fiscal spending multiplier calculations have attracted considerable attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Much of the current literature is based on VAR estimation methods and DSGE models. In line with the Keynesian literature we argue that many of these models probably underestimate the fiscal spending multiplier in recessions. The income-expenditure model of the fiscal spending multiplier can be seen as a good approximation under these circumstances. In its conventional form this model suffers from an underestimation of the multiplier due to an overestimation of the import intake of domestic absorption. In this article we apply input-output calculus to solve this problem. Multipliers thus derived are comparably high, ranging between 1.4 and 1.8 for many member states of the European Union. GDP drops due to budget consolidation might therefore be substantial in times of crisis.
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Predicting Financial Crises: The (Statistical) Significance of the Signals Approach
Makram El-Shagi, Tobias Knedlik, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
The signals approach as an early warning system has been fairly successful in detecting crises, but it has so far failed to gain popularity in the scientific community because it does not distinguish between randomly achieved in-sample fit and true predictive power. To overcome this obstacle, we test the null hypothesis of no correlation between indicators and crisis probability in three applications of the signals approach to different crisis types. To that end, we propose bootstraps specifically tailored to the characteristics of the respective datasets. We find (1) that previous applications of the signals approach yield economically meaningful and statistically significant results and (2) that composite
indicators aggregating information contained in individual indicators add value to the signals approach, even where most individual indicators are not statistically significant on their own.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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The Impact of Banking and Sovereign Debt Crisis Risk in the Eurozone on the Euro/US Dollar Exchange Rate
Stefan Eichler
Applied Financial Economics,
Nr. 15,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of financial crisis risk in the eurozone on the euro/US dollar exchange rate. Using daily data from 3 July 2006 to 30 September 2010, I find that the euro depreciates against the US dollar when banking or sovereign debt crisis risk increases in the eurozone. While the external value of the euro is more sensitive to changes in sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable member countries than in stable member countries, the impact of banking crisis risk is similar for both country blocs. Moreover, rising default risk of medium and large eurozone banks leads to a depreciation of the euro while small banks’ default risk has no significant impact, showing the relevance of systemically important banks with regards to the exchange rate.
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The Performance of Short-term Forecasts of the German Economy before and during the 2008/2009 Recession
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
International Journal of Forecasting,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
The paper analyzes the forecasting performance of leading indicators for industrial production in Germany. We focus on single and pooled leading indicator models both before and during the financial crisis. Pairwise and joint significant tests are used to evaluate single indicator models as well as forecast combination methods. In addition, we investigate the stability of forecasting models during the most recent financial crisis.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster's Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Kredit und Kapital,
Nr. 1,
2012
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany. This recession is very different from previous recessions in particular regarding their causes and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts withthe best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts in the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is small.
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Protect and Survive? Did Capital Controls Help Shield Emerging Markets from the Crisis?
Makram El-Shagi
Economics Bulletin,
Nr. 1,
2012
Abstract
Using a new dataset on capital market regulation, we analyze whether capital controls helped protect emerging markets from the real economic consequences of the 2009 financial and economic crisis. The impact of the crisis is measured by the 2009 forecast error of a panel state space model, which analyzes the business cycle dynamics of 63 middle-income countries. We find that neither capital controls in general nor controls that were specifically targeted to derivatives (that played a crucial role during the crisis) helped shield economies. However, banking regulation that limits the exposure of banks to global risks has been highly successful.
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Crises, rescues, and policy transmission through international banks
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 15/2011,
2011
Abstract
The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking
and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of
markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into
foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks
have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures
has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the
German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy
interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.
Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded
relative to affiliates of other German banks.
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