Factors accounting for the enactment of a competition law – an empirical analysis
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
Nr. 6,
2005
Abstract
The paper is concerned with the factors that account for decisions to enact a national competition law. In a first step, the paper updates and enlarges the existing data bases of countries that have enacted a competition law. The paper then identifies and discusses possible factors that influence the decision to enact a competition law. In a third step, the method of panel-data logit analysis is employed to test a set of hypothesis pertaining to the factors across the time dimension and across countries. The results of this analysis are interpreted in terms of significance and in terms of the sign of their influence on the probability of a country to enact. Given generality of the analysis, the results can shed light on the probability of individual countries, and in particular developing countries, to actually take the step of enactment.
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-Expert
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Nr. 6,
2000
Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a 'timid-pricing' equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an 'aggressive-pricing' equilibrium pops up. For intermediate values of the non-expert's successful repair a 'mixed-pricing' equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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