U.S. Monetary-Fiscal Regime Changes in the Presence of Endogenous Feedback in Policy Rules
Yoosoon Chang, Boreum Kwak
Abstract
We investigate U.S. monetary and fiscal policy regime interactions in a model, where regimes are determined by latent autoregressive policy factors with endogenous feedback. Policy regimes interact strongly: Shocks that switch one policy from active to passive tend to induce the other policy to switch from passive to active, consistently with existence of a unique equilibrium, though both policies are active and government debt grows rapidly in some periods. We observe relatively strong interactions between monetary and fiscal policy regimes after the recent financial crisis. Finally, latent policy regime factors exhibit patterns of correlation with macroeconomic time series, suggesting that policy regime change is endogenous.
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The Joint Dynamics of Sovereign Ratings and Government Bond Yields
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
Can a negative shock to sovereign ratings invoke a vicious cycle of increasing government bond yields and further downgrades, ultimately pushing a country toward default? The narratives of public and political discussions, as well as of some widely cited papers, suggest this possibility. In this paper, we will investigate the possible existence of such a vicious cycle. We find no evidence of a bad long-run equilibrium and cannot confirm a negative feedback loop leading into default as a transitory state for all but the very worst ratings.
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Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus
Claudia M. Buch, C. T. Koch, Michael Koetter
Abstract
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of
bank globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have
acquired substantial market power, and international activities have not
necessarily made banks less risky. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the
actual link between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power.
Analyzing this link is the purpose of this paper. We jointly estimate the
determinants of risk and market power of banks, and we analyze the effects of
changes in terms of the number of foreign countries (the extensive margin) and
the volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin). Our paper has four main
findings. First, there is a strong negative feedback effect between risk and market
power. Second, banks with higher shares of foreign assets, in particular those held
through foreign branches, have higher market power at home. Third, holding
assets in a large number of foreign countries tends to increase bank risk. Fourth,
the impact of internationalization differs across banks from different banking
groups and of different size.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
Nr. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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