Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2019
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
Artikel Lesen
Bankruptcy Spillovers
Shai B. Bernstein, Emanuele Colonnelli, Xavier Giroud, Benjamin Iverson
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 3,
2019
Abstract
How do different bankruptcy approaches affect the local economy? Using US Census microdata, we explore the spillover effects of reorganization and liquidation on geographically proximate firms. We exploit the random assignment of bankruptcy judges as a source of exogenous variation in the probability of liquidation. We find that employment declines substantially in the immediate neighborhood of the liquidated establishments, relative to reorganized establishments. The spillover effects are highly localized and concentrate in nontradable and service sectors, consistent with a reduction in local consumer traffic and a decline in knowledge spillovers between firms. The evidence highlights the externalities that bankruptcy design can impose on nonbankrupt firms.
Artikel Lesen
Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy
Shai B. Bernstein, Emanuele Colonnelli, Benjamin Iverson
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 1,
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences of liquidation and reorganization on the allocation and subsequent utilization of assets in bankruptcy. Using the random assignment of judges to bankruptcy cases as a natural experiment that forces some firms into liquidation, we find that the long-run utilization of assets of liquidated firms is lower relative to assets of reorganized firms. These effects are concentrated in thin markets with few potential users and in areas with low access to finance. These findings suggest that when search frictions are large, liquidation can lead to inefficient allocation of assets in bankruptcy.
Artikel Lesen
Plant-level Employment Development before Collective Displacements: Comparing Mass Layoffs, Plant Closures and Bankruptcies
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Applied Economics,
Nr. 50,
2018
Abstract
This article analyzes the development of employment levels and worker flows before bankruptcies, plant closure without bankruptcies and mass layoffs. Utilizing administrative plant-level data for Germany, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcies. Employment reductions in closing plants, in contrast to bankruptcies and mass layoffs, do not come along with increased worker flows. These patterns point to an intended and controlled shrinking strategy for closures without bankruptcy and to an unintended collapse for bankruptcies and mass layoffs.
Artikel Lesen
Plant-level Employment Development before Collective Displacements: Comparing Mass Layoffs, Plant Closures, and Bankruptcies
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
To assess to what extent collective job displacements can be regarded as unanticipated exogenous shocks for affected employees, we analyze plant-level employment patterns before bankruptcy, plant closure without bankruptcy, and mass layoff. Utilizing administrative data covering all West German private sector plants, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcy. Our analysis of worker flows underlines that bankruptcies seem to struggle for survival while closures follow a shrinking strategy. We conclude that the scope of worker anticipation of upcoming job loss is smallest for mass layoffs and largest for closures without bankruptcy.
Artikel Lesen
Consumer Bankruptcy, Bank Mergers and Information
Jason Allen, H. Evren Damar, David Martinez-Miera
Review of Finance,
Nr. 4,
2016
Abstract
This article analyzes the relationship between consumer bankruptcy patterns and the destruction of soft information caused by mergers. Using a major Canadian bank merger as a source of exogenous variation in local banking conditions, we show that local markets affected by the merger exhibit an increase in consumer bankruptcy rates post-merger. The evidence is consistent with the most plausible mechanism being the disruption of consumer–bank relationships. Markets affected by the merger show a decrease in the merging institutions’ branch presence and market share, including those stemming from higher switching rates. We rule out alternative mechanisms such as changes in quantity of credit, loan rates, or observable borrower characteristics.
Artikel Lesen
Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
Artikel Lesen
The Effect of Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions on Investment in Home Equity
S. Corradin, Reint E. Gropp, H. Huizinga, Luc Laeven
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January
2016
Abstract
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger and less healthy households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy. These results suggest that homestead exemptions have an important bearing on the portfolio allocation of US households and the extent to which they insure against bad shocks.
Artikel Lesen
Economic Failure and the Role of Plant Age and Size
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 3,
2015
Abstract
This paper introduces a large-scale administrative panel data set on corporate bankruptcy in Germany that allows for an econometric analysis of involuntary exits where previous studies mixed voluntary and involuntary exits. Approximately 83 % of all bankruptcies occur in plants with not more than 10 employees, and 61 % of all bankrupt plants are not older than 5 years. The descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate substantial negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk but confirm negative size dependence for mature plants only. Our results corroborate hypotheses stressing increasing capabilities and positional advantage, both predicting negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk due to productivity improvements. The results are not consistent with the theories explaining age dependence via imprinting or structural inertia.
Artikel Lesen
Who Invests in Home Equity to Exempt Wealth from Bankruptcy?
S. Corradin, Reint E. Gropp, H. Huizinga, Luc Laeven
Abstract
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy.
Artikel Lesen
