Names and Behavior in a War
Štěpán Jurajda, Dejan Kovač
Journal of Population Economics,
Nr. 1,
2021
Abstract
We implement a novel empirical strategy for measuring and studying a strong form of nationalism—the willingness to fight and die in a war for national independence—using name choices corresponding to a previous war leader. Based on data on almost half a million soldiers, we first show that having been given a first name that is synonymous with the leader(s) of the Croatian state during World War II predicts volunteering for service in the 1991–1995 Croatian war of independence and dying during the conflict. Next, we use the universe of Croatian birth certificates and the information about nationalism conveyed by first names to suggests that in ex-Yugoslav Croatia, nationalism rose continuously starting in the 1970s and that its rise was curbed in areas where concentration camps were located during WWII. Our evidence on intergenerational transmission of nationalism is consistent with nationalist fathers purposefully reflecting the trade-off between within-family and society-wide transmission channels of political values. We also link the nationalist values we proxy using first name choices to right-wing voting behavior in 2015, 20 years after the war.
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Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics
Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, Francesca Lotti
NBER Working Paper,
Nr. 25136,
2018
Abstract
How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? To answer this question, we build a firm dynamics model, where we allow firms to invest in innovation and/or political connection to advance their productivity and to overcome certain market frictions. Our model generates a number of theoretical testable predictions and highlights a new interaction between static gains and dynamic losses from rent-seeking in aggregate productivity. We test the predictions of our model using a brand-new dataset on Italian firms and their workers, spanning the period from 1993 to 2014, where we merge: (i) firm-level balance sheet data; (ii) social security data on the universe of workers; (iii) patent data from the European Patent Office; (iv) the national registry of local politicians; and (v) detailed data on local elections in Italy. We find that firm-level political connections are widespread, especially among large firms, and that industries with a larger share of politically connected firms feature worse firm dynamics. We identify a leadership paradox: when compared to their competitors, market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. In addition, political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenue, but not in productivity – a result that we also confirm using a regression discontinuity design.
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries
Hans Degryse, Thomas Lambert, Armin Schwienbacher
Economic Journal,
Nr. 611,
2018
Abstract
Voting rights were initially limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development, as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the riskiness and financial returns from stock markets. Our panel data evidence covering the years 1830–1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce greater stock market development, whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive to the banking sector, consistent with Perotti and von Thadden (2006). The results are robust to controlling for other institutional arrangements and endogeneity.
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Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2018
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period 1979–2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to Governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
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Career Experience, Political Effects, and Voting Behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economics Letters,
June
2017
Abstract
We find that career experience shapes the voting behavior of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. Members with a career in the Riksbank and the government prefer higher rates. During a legislation with a center-right (center-left) party administration, MPC members with a career background in the government favor higher (lower) interest rates. Highlights: • The determinants of voting behavior in the Swedish Riksbank are considered. • Voting is analyzed with random effects ordered logit models for 1999–2013. • Interplay of career experience and political factors shapes voting behavior. • Government or Riksbank background leads to higher interest rate votes. • Partisan voting behavior is detected for members with government background.
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Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
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Does Proximity Matter in the Choice of Partners in Collaborative R&D Projects? – An Empirical Analysis of Granted Projects in Germany
Mirko Titze, Philipp Marek, , Clemens Fuhrmeister
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 12,
2014
Abstract
This paper contributes to the discussion on the importance of physical distance in the emergence of cross-region collaborative Research and Development (R&D) interactions. The proximity theory, and its extensions, is used as a theoretical framework. A spatial interaction model for count data was implemented for the empirical analysis of German data from the period from 2005 to 2010. The results show that all tested proximity measurements (geographical, cognitive, social and institutional proximity) have a significant positive influence on collaboration intensity. The proximity paradox, however, cannot be confirmed for geographical, social and institutional proximity, but for cognitive proximity.
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(De-)Centralization and Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence from German Municipalities
Claus Michelsen, Peter Bönisch
Public Choice,
Nr. 3,
2014
Abstract
A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision – and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels – likewise affects voters’ turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.
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Regional House Price Dynamics and Voting Behavior in the FOMC
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economic Inquiry,
Nr. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do.
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