The Impact of Social Capital on Economic Attitudes and Outcomes
Iftekhar Hasan, Qing He, Haitian Lu
Journal of International Money and Finance,
November
2020
Abstract
This article traces the extant literature on the impact of social capital on economic attitudes and outcomes. Special attention is paid to clarify conceptual ambiguities, measurement techniques, channels of influence, and identification strategies. Insights derived from the literature are then used to analyze the marketplace lending industry in China, where the size of the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market is larger than that of the rest of the world combined. Ironically, approximately two-thirds of these online P2P lending platforms have failed. Empirical evidence from the monthly operating data of 735 lending platforms and transaction level data from one prominent platform (Renrendai) shows that platforms in provinces with high social capital have low risk of failure, and borrowers in provinces with high social capital can borrow at low interest rate and are less likely to default. We also provide observations to guide future economic research on social capital.
Artikel Lesen
Drilling and Debt
Erik P. Gilje, Elena Loutskina, Daniel Murphy
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 3,
2020
Abstract
This paper documents a previously unrecognized debt‐related investment distortion. Using detailed project‐level data for 69 firms in the oil and gas industry, we find that highly levered firms pull forward investment, completing projects early at the expense of long‐run project returns and project value. This behavior is particularly pronounced prior to debt renegotiations. We test several channels that could explain this behavior and find evidence consistent with equity holders sacrificing long‐run project returns to enhance collateral values and, by extension, mitigate lending frictions at debt renegotiations.
Artikel Lesen
Democracy and Credit
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
Artikel Lesen
Ostdeutschland 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall: Erreichtes und wirtschaftspolitischer Handlungsbedarf
Reint E. Gropp, Gerhard Heimpold
Wirtschaftsdienst,
Nr. 7,
2019
Abstract
Dass Ostdeutschland bei der Verringerung der Ost-West-Produktivitätslücke nur noch wenig vorankommt, hat nicht nur mit fehlenden Konzernzentralen zu tun. Eine Produktivitätslücke existiert in Betrieben aller Größen. Sie ist im städtischen Raum größer als im ländlichen. Der Fachkräftemangel ist der neue Entwicklungsengpass. Um gegenzusteuern, sollte die Wirtschaftspolitik nicht durch zusätzliche Subventionen, die an die Arbeitsplatzschaffung und -erhaltung gebunden sind, den Produktivitätsdruck abschwächen. Die Produktivitätspotenziale der ostdeutschen Städte gilt es zu heben. Fachkräftesicherung verlangt qualifizierte Zuwanderung mit einer entsprechenden Willkommenskultur in Ostdeutschland.
Artikel Lesen
Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China
Xian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Journal of Banking and Finance,
February
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
Artikel Lesen
The Case for a European Rating Agency: Evidence from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
Marc Altdörfer, Carlos A. De las Salas Vega, Andre Guettler, Gunter Löffler
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
2019
Abstract
Politicians frequently voice that European bond issuers would benefit from the presence of a Europe-based rating agency. We take Fitch as a prototype for such an agency. With its ownership structure and a headquarter in London, Fitch is more European than Moody’s and S&P; during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, it also issued more favorable ratings. Fitch’s rating actions, however, were largely ignored by the bond market. Our results thus cast doubt on the benefits of a European credit rating agency.
Artikel Lesen
Politics, Banks, and Sub-sovereign Debt: Unholy Trinity or Divine Coincidence?
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
Nr. 53,
2018
Abstract
We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.
Artikel Lesen
Lame-Duck CEOs
Marc Gabarro, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Shuo Xia
SSRN Working Papers,
2018
Abstract
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
Artikel Lesen
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Sachsen-Anhalts seit 1990
Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner
Abstract
In diesem Beitrag wird die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Sachsen-Anhalts seit 1990 im Kontext des ostdeutschen Transformationsprozesses von einer Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft zu einer Marktwirtschaft beschrieben. Die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit Sachsen-Anhalts hat in den frühen 1990er Jahren zunächst schnell gegenüber Westdeutschland aufgeholt, vor allem weil der Kapitalstock modernisiert und erweitert worden ist. Seit einiger Zeit stagniert der Aufholprozess jedoch, und das Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Erwerbstätigen liegt etwa 20% unter dem westdeutschen Niveau. Die wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderung besteht darin, den Aufholprozess durch die Förderung von Forschung und Innovation und durch bessere Qualifizierung der Erwerbstätigen weiter voranzubringen.
Artikel Lesen
Do Venture Capital Firms Benefit from a Presence on Boards of Directors of Mature Public Companies?
Iftekhar Hasan, Arif Khurshed, Abdulkadir Mohamed, Fan Wang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2018
Abstract
This paper examines the benefits to venture capital firms of their officers holding directorships in mature public companies in terms of fundraising and investment performance. Our empirical results show that venture capital firms raise more funds, set higher fund-raising targets, and are more likely to successfully exit their investments post-appointment of their officers to boards of directors of S&P 1500 companies. Directorship status in mature public firms provides venture capital firms with enhanced networks, visibility, and credibility, all of which facilitate their fundraising activities. In addition, the knowledge, expertise, and experience acquired through holding directorships in mature public firms are beneficial for their portfolio companies, as measured by the likelihood of successful exits.
Artikel Lesen
