Kommentar: Politische Kreditvergabe der Sparkassen
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 6,
2015
Abstract
Theorien politischer Konjunkturzyklen gehen davon aus, dass Politiker in Wahljahren einer expansiven Steuerpolitik zuneigen, weil sie ein Interesse daran haben, ihre Popularität zu steigern, indem sie die wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen möglichst günstig erscheinen lassen.
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A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector
Sanja Jakovljević, Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Annual Review of Financial Economics,
2015
Abstract
We review existing empirical research on the design and impact of regulation in the banking sector. The impact of each individual piece of regulation may inexorably depend on the set of regulations already in place, the characteristics of the banks involved (from their size or ownership structure to operational idiosyncrasies in terms of capitalization levels or risk-taking behavior), and the institutional development of the country where the regulation is introduced. This complexity is challenging for the econometrician, who relies either on single-country data to identify challenges for regulation or on cross-country data to assess the overall effects of regulation. It is also troubling for the policy maker, who has to optimally design regulation to avoid any unintended consequences, especially those that vary over the credit cycle such as the currently developing macroprudential frameworks.
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Electoral Credit Supply Cycles Among German Savings Banks
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
IWH Online,
Nr. 11,
2015
Abstract
In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.
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Uncertainty, Bank Lending, and Bank-level Heterogeneity
Claudia M. Buch, Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
IMF Economic Review,
Nr. 4,
2015
Abstract
We analyze how uncertainty affects bank lending. We measure uncertainty as the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks to bank-level variables. Comparing this measure of uncertainty in banking to more traditional measures of uncertainty, we find similar but no identical patterns. Higher uncertainty in banking has negative effects on bank lending. This effect is heterogeneous across banks: lending by banks that are better capitalized and have higher liquidity buffers tends to be affected less. Also, the degree of internationalization matters, as loan supply by banks in financially open countries is affected less by uncertainty. The impact of the ownership status of the individual bank is less important, in contrast.
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The Impact of Securitization on Credit Rationing: Empirical Evidence
Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Hans Degryse, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández
Journal of Financial Stability,
2015
Abstract
We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).
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Einlagensicherungssysteme erhöhen das moralische Risiko von Banken
Annika Bacher, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 4,
2015
Abstract
Einlagensicherungsmechanismen sind Bestandteil vieler Finanzsysteme und sollen in Krisenzeiten einen Ansturm der Sparer auf Banken und daraus resultierende Ansteckungseffekte verhindern. Jedoch bergen Sicherungssysteme zusätzliche Risikoanreize für Kreditinstitute, da eine solche Versicherung die Überwachungsanreize der Einlagengeber reduziert. Im Zuge der Finanzkrise von 2007 bis 2009 ist es in vielen Ländern zu Reformen hinsichtlich der Einlagensicherungssysteme gekommen. Dieser Artikel diskutiert die jüngste Anhebung der Einlagensicherungsgrenze in den USA von 100 000 auf 250 000 US-Dollar aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags. Dieser zeigt deutlich, dass durch die Erhöhung der Einlagensicherung in den USA das Risiko der Banken, die von der Erhöhung besonders profitierten, deutlich gestiegen ist, und gibt damit Hinweise auf den bekannten Zielkonflikt von Einlagensicherungssystemen: kurzfristige Stabilisierung während einer Krise gegenüber langfristigen Risikoanreizen für Banken.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
We identify the determinants of all German banks’ sovereign debt exposures between 2005 and 2013 and test for the implications of these exposures for bank risk. Larger, more capital market affine, and less capitalised banks hold more sovereign bonds. Around 15% of all German banks never hold sovereign bonds during the sample period. The sensitivity of sovereign bond holdings by banks to eurozone membership and inflation increased significantly since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, banks prefer sovereigns with lower debt ratios and lower bond yields. Finally, we find that riskiness of government bond holdings affects bank risk only since 2010. This confirms the existence of a nexus between government debt and bank risk.
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Bank Market Power, Factor Reallocation, and Aggregate Growth
R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Journal of Financial Stability,
2015
Abstract
Using a unique firm-level sample of approximately 700,000 firm-year observations of German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this study seeks to identify the effect of bank market power on aggregate growth components. We test for a pre-crisis sample whether bank market power spurs or hinders the reallocation of resources across informationally opaque firms. Identification relies on the dependence on external finance in each industry and the regional demarcation of regional banking markets in Germany. The results show that bank markups spur aggregate SME growth, primarily through technical change and the reallocation of resources. Banks seem to need sufficient markups to generate the necessary private information to allocate financial funds efficiently.
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Friend or Foe? Crowdfunding Versus Credit when Banks are Stressed
Daniel Blaseg, Michael Koetter
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 8,
2015
Abstract
Does bank instability push borrowers to use crowdfunding as a source of external finance? We identify stressed banks and link them to a unique, manually constructed sample of 157 new ventures seeking equity crowdfunding. The sample comprises projects from all German equity crowdfunding platforms since 2011, which we compare with 200 ventures that do not use crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is significantly more likely for new ventures that interact with stressed banks. Innovative funding is thus particularly relevant when conventional financiers are facing crises. But crowdfunded ventures are generally also more opaque and risky than new ventures that do not use crowdfunding.
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