Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Nr. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
Artikel Lesen
The Role of Regional Knowledge Sources for Innovation – An Empirical Assessment
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Freiberg Working Papers, Nr. 15-2005,
Nr. 15,
2005
Abstract
Wir untersuchen die Bedeutung verschiedener Inputs, insbesondere verschiedener Wissensquellen, für den regionalen Output an Erfindungen (Patente) mithilfe einer Wissensproduktionsfunktion. Als Wissensquellen werden die FuE-Beschäftigte im Privatsektor, die Größe der Universitäten und Fachhochschulen sowie das Volumen der von ihnen aus verschiedenen Quellen eingeworbenen Drittmittel berücksichtigt. Die Bedeutung dieser Wissensquellen wurde systematisch auf der Ebene der westdeutschen Kreise getestet, wobei Informationen sowohl über den jeweiligen Kreis als auch über die Nachbarkreise einbezogen wurden. Es stellt sich heraus, dass von der Qualität der in den Universitäten und Fachhochschulen betriebenen Forschung ein signifikanter Einfluss auf die regionale Innovationstätigkeit ausgeht. Die reine Größe der Universitäten und Fachhochschulen in der Region hat hingegen keinen Einfluss. Darüber hinaus ermitteln wir Unterschiede nach Herkunft von Drittmitteln sowie Unterschiede in der Bedeutung verschiedener Fachdisziplinen für regionale Innovationsaktivitäten. Wissensspillover sind im Wesentlichen auf die angrenzenden Kreise begrenzt.
Artikel Lesen
Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
Artikel Lesen
Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
Nr. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
Artikel Lesen
