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Unsägliche Industriepolitik und ein übergriffiger StaatReint GroppThe Pioneer, 1. März 2025
This paper provides a detailed description of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area (cf. Christoffel, Coenen and Warne, 2008).
This paper analyzes the effects of policy rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is not observable which creates a moral hazard problem.
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the transmission of macroprudential policies aimed at limiting bank risk-taking in residential real estate.
We use a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effects of supervision on bank behavior. Under the decentralized structure of U.S. bank supervision, banks in the same geographic area may be supervised by different regulatory offices.
Uncertainty shocks cause economic activity to contract and more so, if monetary policy is constrained by an effective lower bound on interest rates.
The U.S. banking sector has become substantially more concentrated since the 1990s, raising questions about both the causes and implications of this consolidation.
This paper investigates, whether conventional interest rate policy of central banks is a suitable instrument to attenuate excessive mispricing in stocks as suggested by the proponents of a 'leaning against the wind' (LATW) monetary policy.
This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014.
We examine the impact of bank-loan supply shocks on firm outcomes and bank risk-taking employing bank-firm matched credit information for the period 2002-2012.
Nach der Finanzkrise wurden umfangreiche Reformen umgesetzt, damit Schieflagen großer Banken weniger wahrscheinlich und weniger kostspielig werden. Diese Too-big-to-fail-Reformen sind jetzt vom Financial Stability Board (FSB) evaluiert wurden. Der vorliegende Konsultationsbericht zeigt, dass Banken widerstandsfähiger geworden sind, Schocks besser abfedern können, und es bessere Möglichkeiten gibt, mit Banken in Schieflage umzugehen. Die positiven gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekte der Reformen überwiegen; die Kreditvergabe an die Realwirtschaft hat nicht gelitten. Gleichzeitig gibt es aber auch Ansatzpunkte, das neue Regulierungsregime weiter zu verbessern.
