Thou Shalt not Bear False Witness Against Your Customers: Cultural Norms and the Volkswagen Scandal
Iftekhar Hasan, Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper investigates whether cultural norms shaped by religion drive consumer decisions after a corporate scandal. We exploit the unexpected notice of violation by the US Environmental Protection Agency in September 2015, accusing the car producer Volkswagen (VW) to have used software to manipulate car emission values during test phases. Using a difference-in-difference model, we show that new registrations of VW (diesel) cars decline significantly in German counties with a high share of Protestants following the VW scandal. Our results suggest that the enforcement culture rooted in Protestantism affects consumer decisions and penalises corporate fraud.
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Explaining Wage Losses After Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Wage Premiums
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Journal of the European Economic Association,
Nr. 5,
2021
Abstract
This paper investigates whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums, the latter being measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects wage decomposition. Using new German administrative data on displacements from small and large employers, we find that wage losses are to a large extent explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses strongly increase with pre-displacement employer size. This provides an explanation for large and persistent wage losses reported in previous displacement studies typically focusing on large employers, only.
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Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress
Ralph Setzer, Moritz Stieglitz
Abstract
We explore the interaction between labour market reforms and financial frictions. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.
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Energiekrise: Inflation, Rezession, Wohlstandsverlust
Dienstleistungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz,
Nr. 2,
2022
Abstract
Die krisenhafte Zuspitzung auf den Gasmärkten belastet die deutsche Wirtschaft schwer. Durch die reduzierten Gaslieferungen aus Russland ist ein erheblicher Teil des Angebots weggefallen und auch das Risiko gestiegen, dass die verbleibenden Liefer- und Speichermengen im Winter nicht ausreichen, um die Nachfrage zu decken. Die Gaspreise sind in den Sommermonaten in die Höhe geschossen, und auch auf den Terminmärkten zeigen sich für einen längeren Zeitraum deutlich höhere Notierungen. Die dadurch stark steigenden Verbraucherpreise schmälern insbesondere die Kaufkraft der privaten Haushalte. Die Wirtschaftsleistung dürfte im dritten Quartal bereits leicht gesunken sein. Im Winterhalbjahr ist ein deutlicher Rückgang zu erwarten. Dass dieser nicht noch kräftiger ausfällt, ist dem hohen Auftragspolster im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe zu verdanken. Insgesamt dürfte die Produktion in diesem Jahr trotz des Rückgangs in der zweiten Jahreshälfte um 1,4% ausgeweitet werden. Damit halbieren die Institute ihre Prognose vom Frühjahr für dieses Jahr annähernd. Für das kommende Jahr ist zu erwarten, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im Jahresdurchschnitt um 0,4% zurückgeht. Im Frühjahr erwarteten die Institute noch einen Anstieg von 3,1%. In dieser Revision zeigt sich das Ausmaß der Energiekrise. Im Jahr 2024 expandiert das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im Jahresdurchschnitt mit 1,9%. Die Inflationsrate dürfte sich in den kommenden Monaten weiter erhöhen. Jahresdurchschnittlich ergibt sich für das Jahr 2023 mit 8,8% eine Teuerungsrate, die leicht über dem Wert des laufenden Jahres (8,4%) liegt. Erst im Jahr 2024 wird die 2%-Marke allmählich wieder erreicht.
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Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers' Tax Cut in Sweden
Emmanuel Saez, Benjamin Schoefer, David Seim
American Economic Review,
Nr. 5,
2019
Abstract
This paper uses administrative data to analyze a large employer-borne payroll tax rate cut for young workers in Sweden. We find no effect on net-of-tax wages of young treated workers relative to slightly older untreated workers, and a 2–3 percentage point increase in youth employment. Firms employing many young workers receive a larger tax windfall and expand right after the reform: employment, capital, sales, and profits increase. These effects appear stronger in credit-constrained firms. Youth-intensive firms also increase the wages of all their workers collectively, young as well as old, consistent with rent sharing of the tax windfall.
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Jobs and Matches: Quits, Replacement Hiring, and Vacancy Chains
Yusuf Mercan, Benjamin Schoefer
American Economic Review: Insights,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
In the canonical DMP model of job openings, all job openings stem from new job creation. Jobs denote worker-firm matches, which are destroyed following worker quits. Yet, employers classify 56 percent of vacancies as quit-driven replacement hiring into old jobs, which evidently outlived their previous matches. Accordingly, aggregate and firm-level hiring tightly track quits. We augment the DMP model with longer-lived jobs arising from sunk job creation costs and replacement hiring. Quits trigger vacancies, which beget vacancies through replacement hiring. This vacancy chain can raise total job openings and net employment. The procyclicality of quits can thereby amplify business cycles.
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Wages and the Value of Nonemployment
Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer, Samuel Young, Josef Zweimüller
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than $0.01 per $1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than $0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of $0.24–$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.
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Hysteresis from Employer Subsidies
Emmanuel Saez, Benjamin Schoefer, David Seim
Journal of Public Economics,
August
2021
Abstract
This paper uses administrative data to analyze a large and 8-year long employer payroll tax rate cut in Sweden for young workers aged 26 or less. We replicate previous results documenting that during the earlier years of the reform, it raised youth employment among the treated workers, driven by labor demand (as workers’ take-home wages did not respond). First, drawing on additional years of data, this paper then documents that the longer-run effects during the reform are twice as large as the medium-run effects. Second, we document novel labor-demand-driven “hysteresis” from this policy – i.e. persistent employment effects even after the subsidy no longer applies – along two dimensions. Over the lifecycle, employment effects persist even after workers age out of eligibility. Three years after the repeal, employment remains elevated at the maximal reform level in the formerly subsidized ages. These hysteresis effects more than double the direct employment effects of the reform. Discrimination against young workers in job posting fell during the reform and does not bounce back after repeal, potentially explaining our results.
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Labor in the Boardroom
Jörg Heining, Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 2,
2021
Abstract
We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.
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