The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

Utilizing near real-time QuickBooks data from over 1.6 million small businesses and a targeted survey, this paper highlights the critical role credit card financing plays for small business activity. We examine a two year period beginning in January of 2021. A turbulent period during which, credit card usage by small U.S. businesses nearly doubled, interest payments rose by 60%, and delinquencies reached 2.8%. We find, first, monthly credit card payments were up to three times higher than loan payments during this time. Second, we use targeted surveys of these small businesses to establish credit cards as a key financing source in response to firm-level shocks, such as uncertain cash flows and overdue invoices. Third, we establish the importance of credit cards as an important financial transmission mechanism. Following the Federal Reserve’s rate hikes in early 2022, banks cut credit card supply, leading to a 15.75% drop in balances and a 10% decline in revenue growth, as well as a 1.5% decrease in employment growth among U.S. small businesses. These higher rates also rendered interest payments unsustainable for many, contributing to half of the observed increase in delinquencies. Lastly, a simple heterogeneous firm model with a cash-in-hand constraint illustrates the significant macroeconomic impact of credit card financing on small business activity.

We investigate the predictive power of loan spreads for forecasting business cycles, specifically focusing on more constrained, intermediary-reliant firms. We introduce a novel loan-market-based credit spread constructed using secondary corporate loan-market prices over the 1999 to 2023 period. Loan spreads significantly enhance the prediction of macroeconomic outcomes, outperforming other credit-spread indicators. We also explore the underlying mechanisms and differentiate between borrower fundamentals and financial frictions. Evidence suggests that supply-side frictions are a decisive factor in the forecasting ability of loan spreads.

The Transition Report 2024-25 focuses on industrial policies in the EBRD regions and beyond. Such policies have seen a resurgence, seeking to address market failures such as environmental degradation. However, their track record is mixed. Their growing popularity is shaped primarily by domestic political economy considerations and rising geopolitical tensions. While industrial policies are typically employed by higher-income economies, they are also now used more frequently in economies with less administrative and fiscal capacity to implement them.

Finanzmarktkrisen verursachen in der Regel hohe Kosten. Banken müssen stabilisiert werden, um einen Zusammenbruch des Bankensystems zu verhindern, was immense Kosten für den Staat bedeuten kann. Ebenso kommt es im Zuge von Finanzmarktkrisen zu einem starken Rückgang der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität, der im Vergleich zu gewöhnlichen Rezessionen länger anhält. Die Finanzmarktkrise hat dies ein weiteres Mal verdeutlicht und eine Phase der signifikanten Verschärfung der Regulierung und Aufsicht von Banken eingeleitet. Die Legislative hat das »Window of Opportunity« gut genutzt, und sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf europäischer Ebene wurden neue gesetzliche Grundlagen für eine stärkere Regulierung des Bankensystems erfolgreich eingeführt. Ein erster Erfolg des neuen regulatorischen Umfelds zeigte sich während der Corona-Pandemie, in der das Bankensystem stabil blieb. Dies wird auch durch die aktuell steigenden Eigenkapitalquoten und vergleichsweise niedrigen Ausfallraten im Kreditportfolio der Banken deutlich. Hervorzuheben ist außerdem, dass nicht nur auf nationaler Ebene Anstrengungen unternommen wurden, das regulatorische Umfeld für Banken zu verbessern, sondern dass es auch auf Ebene der Europäischen Union (EU) gelungen ist, mit dem »Single Rulebook« einen einheitlichen regulatorischen Rahmen zu schaffen. Dies wirkt Verschiebungen von Risiken innerhalb der EU entgegen. Trotz dieser Erfolge und positiven Entwicklungen darf nicht übersehen werden, dass sich durch staatliches Eingreifen und die Einführung neuer Regulierungsvorschriften nicht nur der betroffene Sektor, also die Banken, anpassen. Es kann auch zu Auswirkungen auf verschiedenste Akteure kommen, die direkt oder indirekt mit dem Bankensystem interagieren. Zudem kann es im Anpassungsprozess zu dynamischen Effekten kommen. Im Beitrag gehen wir auf zwei ausgewählte Aspekte ein, welche in diesem Zusammenhang von der Legislative zu beachten sind. 

Der Beitrag ist Teil des Artikels “Die Zukunft des europäischen Finanzsystems – zwischen Risiken und mangelnder Wettbewerbsfähigkeit?“, erschienen in: ifo Schnelldienst, 2024, 77, Nr. 07, 03-36.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation.